

The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME IV

New York, Saturday, September 18, 1915

Number 46

Contents

Editorial Notes.....	163
Leading Editorials	
Breaking with Germany?.....	166
The Short Cut.....	168
Eight Hours for Work.....	170
What is Opinion?.....	171
General Articles	
England's Changing War-Mind..... J. A. Hobson	173
The Matter with Russia..... Gerald Morgan	175
A Court for the Garment Trades.... Helen L. Sumner	176
Margaret Derenzy..... Lee Wilson Dodd	178
The German Polity..... George Louis Beer	181
Correspondence.....	183
After the Play..... Q. K.	185
Books and Things..... P. L.	186
Reviews of Books	
Creative Portraiture..... Felix Grendon	187
A German Accuses Germany.....	188
The Civilian Canal Builders..... Alvin S. Johnson	189

EX-SENATOR ROOT'S firm, tactful, and enlightened leadership of the New York Constitutional Convention has naturally resulted in the increased discussion of his qualifications as a Presidential candidate. A large number of influential Republicans east of the Mississippi River have decided that he is the one man capable of giving dignity and momentum to the Republican Presidential canvass. The other proposed candidates, Justice Hughes excepted, do not compare favorably with President Wilson either in intellectual ability, in patriotic earnestness, or in special equipment for the immediately important work of the Chief Executive. But Mr. Root in certain respects is better qualified to act as President in the present emergency than is Mr. Wilson. The immediately pressing problems concern foreign affairs, military preparedness and administrative reorganization. In relation to all of these matters Mr. Root's record is exceptionally good. As Secretary of War he supplied the army with the beginnings of a modern organization. As Secretary of State he handled the problems of foreign politics not only skillfully but with the vision of a statesman. He could be

trusted to deal with the vexed and difficult questions of military preparedness and foreign policy with moderation, with insight, with prevision and with a firm intention to make American preparedness and diplomatic action contribute to international security and peace. Finally, his record at Albany testifies to the warm interest which he is now taking in the all-important work of making our representative agencies responsible to public opinion, and of adopting our administrative machinery to modern social and economic needs. Mr. Wilson, since he has been President, has disappointed his sympathizers among the progressives of other parties most of all by his indifference to the necessity of raising administrative standards, no matter at what cost to party harmony.

NOTWITHSTANDING Mr. Root's exceptional qualifications for the work of the Presidential office, his popularity as a candidate would suffer very much from the antagonisms provoked by his career. There would be aroused against him all the bitter personal, sectional and class opposition which remain left over from the political controversies of the Taft administration. The Republican voters of the Western states are not interested in military preparedness, foreign policy and administrative reorganization. They are still very much interested in preventing any man from becoming President whose profession or business career has been closely associated with Eastern corporations. If Mr. Root were nominated, this powerful element in American public opinion would do either one of two things. It would support Mr. Wilson or it would run an independent candidate. No matter which course is adopted, Mr. Wilson would be reelected—assuming, of course, that he continues to hold his present following in and outside the party. Thus Mr. Root's qualifications for the work of being President are nullified by his unavailability as a candidate. The net impression which his career has left on public opinion throughout a large part of the country is fatal to his pros-

pects. He would figure in the mind of the West and the Middle-West as a reactionary candidate, and as a matter of fact his supporters would be found almost entirely among the followers of Mr. Taft in 1912. All the professional opponents of corporate interests would pounce upon him and begin a campaign of personal abuse which would be reminiscent of the Hearst campaign against McKinley and Hanna. Mr. Root knows all this better than anyone else. The knowledge should persuade him not to sanction the submission of his name to the voters of his party. His own past would prevent his real qualifications as a candidate from getting a fair hearing.

PATERSON'S authorities have taken the law into their hands and forcibly prevented the I. W. W. representatives, Carlo Fresca and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, from speaking in the city. In doing this they have acted no more lawfully and with no more respect for constitutional rights than do the hasty mobs that tar and feather unpopular citizens, or hang suspected persons by the neck until they are dead. Our Federal Constitution provides that the right of free speech shall not be abridged, and adequate remedies are provided by law for the abuse of this right. The law does not, however, permit any group of men, whether in office or not, to arrest people before they have spoken and to ship them out of the city. The argument that would permit such an action is analogous to the argument which would justify the Georgia mob that lynched Frank. Yet we find the *New York Times* enthusiastically applauding this illegality. It admits "that free speech is a noble and indispensable right." But in view of the fact that the I. W. W. speakers are "spouters" and "ranters," "vultures" and "rattlesnakes," and because Paterson lost fifteen million dollars in the recent strike, the authorities are justified in breaking the law and violating the letter and the spirit of the Constitution of the United States. Is the *Times* in favor of the Constitution only when it protects property rights? Is it against the Constitution when it protects the rights of "spouters" and "ranters"?

ONE might easily argue that Anthony Comstock does as much good as harm. We admit his intellectual and moral delinquencies, his thin bigotry and his prudery. But it often happens that bigots are able to perform labors that others might shrink from. Mr. Comstock has just performed a public service in securing the widest possible publicity for Mrs. Sanger's proposals in favor of birth control. He has done this cleverly. There were some six copies of Mrs. Sanger's pamphlet "Family Limitation" in the possession of her husband,

William Sanger, an architect of New York City. They had no circulation and were as good as dead. But Mr. Comstock sent his agent, one Charles J. Bamberger, to ferret them out, and Bamberger, by pretending to be a friend of Mrs. Sanger's in possession of all her earlier works, managed to secure a copy. The result was what Mr. Comstock might have anticipated. Mr. Sanger, arrested on a charge of circulating immoral literature, was tried and convicted, and the newspapers gave long reports to the consideration of a question which Mr. Comstock and an obsolete law believe should not be discussed nor even mentioned. Since we hold the matter of birth control to be an eminently fit and proper subject for public discussion, we cannot but feel grateful to Mr. Sanger for going to jail as a protest against a law which is futile as well as insulting to the intelligence of the people. But no small share of the credit for bringing this question to the attention of tens of thousands of men and women is due to Mr. Anthony Comstock.

THE *New York World* presents no evidence to justify its headline, "Germans Offer \$1,000,000.00 for Longshoremen Strike and Riots on Docks in U. S." The *World* proves that a Boston grocer, Matthew Cummings, proposed to tie up freight shipments by means of a strike to be financed by parties unknown, and it hints that Dr. Dernburg was the principal, the "big man" for whom Cummings worked. But it adduces no evidence to sustain this charge. There is nothing to show that Cummings was not acting on his own account, without authorization and without the power to carry out any deal he might complete. None the less the story with many of its ugly inferences will doubtless carry. The Dumba revelations, the implication of von Papen, the Albert correspondence, as well as the over-vehement and not very astute German propaganda against the exportation of arms, have created so dense an atmosphere of suspicion that much will now be believed that is not true and many men will be accused who will be innocent.

"EQUAL pay for equal work," according to Mr. and Mrs. John Martin, writing in the *New York Times* of September 12th, is a principle that does not, cannot and should not obtain, in industry or anywhere else. In private establishments men and women are paid unequally, but as a rule for unequal services: so much for the actuality. Let the experiment of equal pay be tried. If wages are fixed at the women's level, men will be forced out; if fixed at the men's level, the competition of the men will force the women out. This disposes of the practical possibility of equal wages. As to the ethics of the case, the principle

of equal pay is in conflict with what Mr. and Mrs. Martin regard as the superior principle of the minimum wage. For a woman's minimum is an individual minimum; there are in the theory of law no obligations upon her except her own support. A man's minimum is a family minimum, because a man has obligations beyond those of supporting himself. Suppose we made the minimum for a given service sufficiently high to cover the cost of maintaining a family, ignoring the possibility that this generous wage might fall to a woman, as we ignore the possibility that it might fall to a bachelor. According to Mr. and Mrs. (or is it Mr. or Mrs.?) John Martin, a family wage for women is "economically impossible." But grant its possibility, we must thereupon abandon the legal obligation upon the man to support his wife and children. Further, to give women wages in excess of their individual needs "advances a long way toward the subjugation of woman to material production, and her elimination from homemaking, baby-bearing, and child-training." What the argument involves is plainly not an economic theory but a judgment upon contemporary manhood. Nothing but universal economic discrimination against women can drive them into the state of matrimony; nothing but the economic unavailability of his wife can compel a man to give of his earnings for the support of his family.

IT is inevitable that every policy seriously advocated should gather about it much argument that is unsound and even absurd. Just now many of the absurdest arguments are being used to bolster up the cause of military preparedness. The war has proved, we are told, that there is no such thing as international ethics. The United States is rich and undefended; shall we not then awake some morning to find a group of predatory powers offering us a choice between our money and our lives? The president of one of the societies now working to create public sentiment in favor of a stronger army and navy asserts that before the close of the war most of the gold of the world will be heaped up in the United States, and that there is serious danger that the victors in the war will come after it. And if we suggest that it is late in history to revive the enterprise of piracy, even as a public industry, we are bidden to ponder the examples of China, Morocco, Persia. These were rich countries, and undefended. Their liberties have vanished or are vanishing. Rich countries? By the standards of wealth accepted by occidental nations, China, Morocco and Persia are desperately poor. Accordingly the analogy fails. Poor nations, not rich, fall victims to imperialistic greed. Not even the most savage critic of Germany charges her with

designs upon the wealth of the Belgians. She is indeed charged with coveting the Congo, but this is another desperately poor section of the earth.

SO much of evil is at the door of the imperialistic exploiter that it is hard for us to concede the validity of any excuse that he can make for himself. Admittedly he steals and robs; what then can be said for him? But by preference he steals that which is of no present value to his victims. What excites the cupidity of the modern exploiter is not the vast stocks of silks and curious and precious products in the shops and warehouses of China, nor yet the accumulated gold and silver in private or public hands. It is the unequalled deposits of coal which never have been worked by the Chinese, and never can be worked until China is modernized. It is the gains to be had from building railways to take millions of tons of freight off the coolies' backs; from the substitution of hydro-electric power for man and woman power in the grinding of corn, in the pumping of water, and in the multitudinous processes of manufacture. The German exploiter of Mesopotamia does not propose to rob the Arab or the Armenian of his camels and rugs. What he wants to do is to take the desert away from the jackal and the wild ass. Run through the whole list of modern imperialistic enterprises, you will find everywhere the same principle of exploitation: the seizure and utilization of resources that are not wealth to the native at all, but are riches to the exploiter. It is neglect of their natural resources that has kept the backward nations poor, and it is this neglect that exposes them to the exploiter. What he does is more likely than not to fall to the immediate advantage of the exploited peoples. This is far from a justification of imperialistic exploitation. With the establishment of a capable government of their own, independent or under the protection of a nation not seeking merely its own profit, the natural resources of the backward nations might be opened to the world's use, under such conditions that the profits would flow to those nations themselves instead of excessively enriching alien enterprise, and thus encouraging international strife.

THE Chicago school board has declared war on the teachers' federation. By a small but exceedingly firm majority that board has voted to destroy the unionization of the teachers as "affecting discipline and efficiency." No one expects that this forcible suppression can be conducted without resistance. Miss Margaret Haley, the leader of the federation, is not a sucking dove. But even the knowledge that Miss Haley will fight does not make the situation other than noisome. The uncomfortable accuracy with which Miss Haley has

shot barbs into previous school boards accounts in part for the board's action. The Catholic issue and the labor issue are also involved. What Chicago needs, however, is not to cure the federation of its supposed ills by suppressing it. It is to remember that a school board which adopts these tactics simply writes out its own incompetency. Chicago knows that the teachers have clear interests which the school board has utterly failed to conserve or interpret. However badly the teachers' federation conducts those interests, its suppression is an abuse of public power.

ANTON FENDRICH of Baden, Socialist, has lately been to the western front and had an interview with the Emperor William. Bits of this interview have been cabled to the *Sun*. Here is one of them: "The Emperor related for half an hour horrible French atrocities. Carried away by the monstrosity of these proved facts, which leave no hope for decadent France, the Emperor wept more than once at the shame of such demoralization of a once noble people, victimized now by a fixed idea." Remember while reading that the Emperor is not a conscious obvious hypocrite. The war, as conducted by his country, has put him into a position where the more French atrocities he can regard as "proved facts" the less unhappy he is over certain other atrocities. A day upon which he wept spontaneously at the shame of once noble France, once noble England, once noble Belgium and once noble Russia, would for the Emperor William be a pretty good day.

Breaking With Germany?

GERMANY and the United States are once again trembling on the edge of a serious break. The last German note reiterates the intention of the German government not to allow the sinking of passenger boats by submarines without giving non-combatants a chance to escape, but claims that the submarine commander had a sufficient reason for anticipating an attack by the Arabic. Such being the case, it justifies the torpedoing and refuses to admit any liability for its results, even if investigation proves that the submarine commander was mistaken. Its repudiation of liability is not, however, absolute. It proposes to submit to arbitration the question of liability in the event of such mistakes. How much of the controversy the German government is willing to arbitrate is left ambiguous by the note; but there can be no ambiguity about the general effect of the latest German attempt to give "complete satisfaction" to the American government. For all practical pur-

poses it leaves the controversy between the two governments much as it was on the day after the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

The majority of Americans will look upon this behavior as sufficiently unreasonable to cast doubt upon the good faith of the German government; but any such question should not be raised until all hope of reaching an agreement is abandoned. Whether the Germans are negotiating in good faith or not, they are certainly not negotiating with the intention of yielding any more of the American case than can possibly be helped. In the negotiation they are adopting the method of raising one irrelevant side issue after another, and of delaying any admission of liability or any agreement on the merits of concrete grievances, until the general military situation makes substantial concessions either expedient or unnecessary. If the American government wrings any substantial concessions from Germany these concessions will be the result of a calculation by the German Foreign Office that American hostility would be more costly than would be the measures necessary to placate it. The two essential points upon which the attention of the American government should be directed are, consequently, the probable results of the latest definition of German submarine policy, and the probable inconvenience to Germany of a vigorous assertion of American dissatisfaction.

As to the practical effect of the latest definition of the submarine policy, it undoubtedly imperils the essential minimum for which our government with the consent of public opinion has been contending. We have been and still are willing to submit to a great deal from Germany in order to avoid a break, but we cannot submit to the continued killing of American citizens who are pursuing under the protection of international law an innocent and normal occupation. If Germany persisted in defending the legitimacy of the submarine campaign but moderated its application to meet the American contentions, the controversy could, as is the case with England, be kept indefinitely on the plane of diplomatic negotiation. Yet this is precisely what Germany has not done. She has abandoned the principle which underlay the original proclamation of a war zone—the principle that a submarine is justified in sinking all enemy vessels without warning. But she is placing an interpretation on her abandonment of the principle which permits her to kill Americans on English vessels almost with impunity. We Americans were willing to let the Germans flourish the principle, provided they did not act too vigorously upon it. The Germans, on the other hand, preferred to devise a way of acting on a principle which they had formally abandoned. To yield to the implications of the last German note would

be to connive at the killing of Americans on English vessels, whenever the nervous or unscrupulous commander of a German submarine could make it look as if his boat were about to be attacked. Of course, the experience of the last few months has proved that the commander of a submarine is particularly likely to be apprehensive and to give himself and his crew the benefit of every doubt.

President Wilson is faced once again by the unpleasant alternatives of yielding the central point of the controversy with Germany, or of emphasizing his dissatisfaction by some such act as the severance of diplomatic relations. The choice is a difficult one at best, and it is rendered the more difficult by the events of the last ten days. The severance of diplomatic relations is an act which lies wholly within the discretion of the Chief Executive. Yet it is an act which may eventually result in war, and the President doubtless has scruples about involving the nation in war without its own explicit consent. At present the American people is morally and mentally unprepared to fight upon the submarine issue. An all too audible sigh of relief was heard on every side at the prosperous prospect of getting rid of the controversy opened up by the Chancellor's note of September 7th. The relief was so great that no attention was directed either by the administration or by the newspapers to the inevitable causes of future friction which even the most favorable interpretation of the Chancellor's letter left conspicuously present. A majority of the American people showed plainly that left to itself it was willing to make almost any concession to avoid war. The German government may well have been persuaded by the self-revelation of American public opinion to risk a reopening of the whole controversy. Count von Bernstorff assuredly took notice of the popular lack of interest in the issue, and may have used the calculated indiscretion of the repudiated interview in the *New York Evening Sun* to serve notice on Americans that the severance of diplomatic relations meant war. But President Wilson had most reason to remark this popular indifference. He knows better than anyone how lukewarm or opposed the West and the South are to any participation in the war, and in all probability he himself sympathizes with this attitude. Ten days ago he was screwed up to the point of enforcing the American contention by a severance of diplomatic relations, and so to a less degree was the country, but by intentionally or unintentionally relaxing the tension at the right moment the German government has strengthened the moral and mental obstacles to any formidable resolution or any decisive action.

In spite of popular indifference and even of personal doubts, President Wilson should act promptly and decisively. Unless more satisfactory explana-

tions are immediately forthcoming, he should recall Ambassador Gerard and ask Count von Bernstorff to accompany Dr. Dumba. He must realize by this time that hesitation or yielding will merely stiffen German resistance or increase German demands. His only chance of securing the safety of Americans on English vessels and of rescuing international law from the suffocating grip of an unscrupulous enemy is to make the Germans understand the full cost of American hostility. The inconvenience of this hostility was sufficient to make the Germans repudiate the principle upon which the original war zone proclamation was based. It may be sufficient to make them willing to clear up existing ambiguities, to assume full liability for the mistakes of their own naval officers, and in this way to give submarine commanders a motive for discouraging rather than encouraging the use of torpedoes. In any event the pressure should be applied without delay, because the course of the war during the next few months may make American hostility less rather than more dangerous.

As to Mr. Wilson's personal responsibility for acting in a crisis more vigorously than public opinion might approve, that is the inevitable privilege and penalty of his office. He cannot escape the duty and the risk of leadership. By breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany Mr. Wilson is not necessarily precipitating his country in war. If war should follow that would only be because Germany provoked hostilities, either by taking offence and declaring war, or by continuing to pursue her own military advantage at the expense of the lives of inoffensive Americans. War, that is, would really be precipitated by further German aggression, which if it occurred, would rally behind any belligerent attitude adopted by the American government the support of a sufficient consensus of public opinion. What the nation needs from Mr. Wilson in the present crisis is firm, courageous and dependable leadership. Popular opinion is half formed and unenlightened. It is not fully aware of the overwhelming importance for the future security of pacific social democracy of a triumph of the principles for which the American government is contending. President Wilson is aware of it. He can bring home to Americans their responsibility by attaching to the American case the sanction of a decisive act, indicative of lively American displeasure and prophetic of effective American resistance. We hope that he will not have to do so at the risk of war; but if he does have to do so at the risk of war, his conscience should be as clear as that of a former President, when, at a moment of still graver crisis and a still deeper division of opinion, Lincoln accepted the danger of civil war rather than compromise with the South.

The Short Cut

THE theory underlying official investigation is that once the nation knows the truth it will know what to do. It assumes that disagreements between social groups are in the main due to different apprehensions of the facts of the case. Select a commission of fair-minded men, whose vision will be undistorted by bias, and who in any case will state the facts as they see them, believing that truth will prevail over prejudice and falsehood. Or if unbiased men cannot be found, appoint commissioners whose mental astigmatism will correct one another, and let these confer long and patiently, as jurymen confer, until they are agreed as to the state of facts, even though they should not be agreed upon the right interpretation of the facts. Let each side cross-examine the witnesses of the other side. Let either side prove that the testimony presented is untrue, inapplicable, unrepresentative, or misleading. Let the conclusions follow the evidence, and do not select the evidence to fit conclusions. The result will be a close approximation to the facts of the particular case, and upon this presentment, the nation, assembled in its Congress or Parliament, will know how to act.

In interpreting this theory certain facts must be borne in mind. In the first place, men cannot be made to believe the truth, let alone act upon it, if it is flatly opposed to their dominant interests or cuts athwart their general attitude towards life. Moreover, the nation is not one homogeneous unit but a group of groups, of which some believe that grey is black and others are sure that grey is white. Within these limitations, however, the theory has validity. In most controversies in which a decision can be reached, judgment is given by the vote of a middle, half-interested group, whose particular prejudices are not clearly involved, who are not immune to reason and not inhospitable to new facts, and who, once convinced, add their influence to that of one or the other of two opposed and partisan groups, thus gaining the victory. It is this middle group, differing somewhat with each problem, which begins by being ignorant of the facts and is convinced, slowly or rapidly, by the evidence. Whether the question be one of easy divorce, free trade, the open shop, preparedness or prohibition, it is always this middle group that asks for the facts.

Our whole theory of government, and especially our theory of congressional investigation, may be based upon the supposition of just such an arbitral group, standing between two opposed minorities, and deciding in the light of facts. When the legislature cannot determine a question, because the clamorous minorities are assailing each other with statement and counter-statement, a commission is

appointed to learn the truth. The commission is the eye of the legislature. Its function is to see, to focus the situation, to reproduce it in little. If it does not do this, if it evolves a report out of its inner consciousness, if instead of looking at the facts it merely tells the legislature what the facts might, could or should be, it fails of its purpose. It is then merely doing for one minority or another what that minority could have done for itself within the legislature. It gains no converts. It only intensifies the belief of its adherents and the disbelief of its opponents. It merely argues. It does not see.

It was from this point of view that in an earlier issue we criticised the Walsh or Manly report of the Industrial Relations Commission, for which we are taken to account in a letter from Mr. Manly, published in this issue. Mr. Manly seems somewhat to misconceive our position. While we believe that the conclusions of this Walsh report are in part half-baked, uncritical, and even grotesque, it is not against these findings but against the manner in which they were reached that we raised our voice. The Commission did investigate. It spent many thousands of dollars of the public money in special studies. But it did not use these investigations after they were made, or after they were begun and left unfinished. In the rare cases in which it did use them it used them so ineptly as to deprive the work of all value. The report has next to nothing to do with the investigations upon which it should have been based.

The result is what might have been expected, a mere heaping up of proposals old and very old; good, very good, very bad and ridiculous. It is a report which might have been written by any literate young man with access to the public libraries and a plentiful supply of white paper. Many of the conclusions are radical, even revolutionary, but the document that contains them will disappoint both radicals and revolutionaries. For, not being based on new facts, not being erected on the solid foundation of a patient and candid investigation of the conditions of our industrial society, it carries no more conviction and bears no more emphasis than would any other parade of generalizations, unsifted, uncriticized, and unsupported. It will convert no one who is not already convinced. For us, who believe with Mr. Walsh that deep-going and painful changes must take place before anything like industrial democracy or equality is attained, many of his conclusions are like the welcome return of a friendly guest. But Mr. Walsh has not added anything to the viability of the proposals that he has adopted. He has honored them by introducing them into an official report. That is all he has done.

The trouble is that Mr. Walsh did not really

believe in investigation. He is not a scientist. He does not understand the tremendous impact of a new generalization based upon careful study, such a generalization as that of Charles Booth's "Life and Labor of the People of London," which has powerfully affected the opinion of Europe and America for almost a generation. Mr. Walsh is the politician, the man who seeks to reflect the opinion of his constituents. To such a man, knowing what people think about a thing is more important than knowing the thing. It is for this reason as well as for their publicity value that Mr. Walsh preferred hearings to investigations. He believed that, to investigate the causes of social unrest, what was primarily necessary was to gather the opinions of the people most affected. If you wish to discover the nature and cause of a new disease, do not waste your time with a microscope and germ cultures, but ask all the patients you can find what they *think* the cause of the disease is. Investigation may be all right for economists and other dull people—and a certain amount is necessary to give bulk and dignity to a report—but the facts discovered are likely to obscure theories, and at best they form merely a detached appendix, a sop thrown to pedants.

So far as the press reports show, the findings of the Walsh report are almost completely separated from the special studies upon which they were supposed to be based. Among others, the following subjects are claimed to have been "treated at length"; "unemployment, organization, methods and policies of trade unions; methods and policies of employers' associations; joint agreements; agencies of mediation, investigation and arbitration; sickness insurance; scientific management; prison labor; immigration; labor conditions in colonial possessions, and Chinese exclusion." But where is the connecting link between these investigations and the findings of the Commission? The Commission paid out money to study the subject of scientific management. What trace do we find of any influence of this investigation in the long press abstract of the report? What new conclusions, or indeed what old conclusions, have resulted from the studies of mediation, investigation, arbitration? Some of these special reports will doubtless appear in the ultimate volumes to be issued by the Commission. But they are not woven in. They are not a part of the findings.

And how has the Commission used the evidence that it did consider worth while to reproduce? A special investigation into the whole question of trade union policy was made by Dr. George E. Barnett, a capable and thorough student of this subject. We should have been glad to read what conclusions Dr. Barnett had reached as to how collective bargaining might contribute to the solution of the labor

problem. But we have not his report. All we have is, to use Mr. Manly's word, a "condensation."

Now to condense, says Webster's Dictionary, is "to make more close, compact or dense; to compress or concentrate into a smaller compass; to consolidate; abridge; epitomize; concentrate; intensify." You do not condense when you leave out all essentials and simply reproduce the commonplaces and the gossip of a subject. You do not condense a dog when you cut off everything but his tail. In Mr. Manly's condensation of Dr. Barnett's unprinted report we are gravely informed that "a few trade unions exclude qualified persons from membership by high initiation fees or other devices," but that "the evidence presented to the Commission shows clearly that the policy of exclusion is anti-social and monopolistic, and should be given up by those unions which practice it." Did we pay four hundred thousand dollars to be told this? We are also assured that some of the union rules restricting output "cannot be defended; these rules are anti-social and should be given up." We are still further informed that "jurisdictional disputes are the occasion of frequent and costly strikes. . . . It is suggested that the Commission recommend to the American Federation of Labor and to the national unions that renewed and more effective efforts be made to prevent such disputes." Clearly the specific gravity of Dr. Barnett's investigation is not increased by condensation. What is there in this condensation that has not appeared in every book and pamphlet upon trade unionism during the last thirty years?

It is of course not Mr. Walsh's fault, nor Mr. Manly's. Mr. Walsh is a strong, able and courageous man with a real sympathy for the men at the bottom, an admirable agitator and a born leader, but temperamentally as unfitted for the particular task assigned to him as William Lloyd Garrison would have been. Mr. Manly also did the best he could under circumstances that could not have been more adverse. Within these limitations they have done a certain amount of good by dramatizing economic oppression, by bringing home to sluggish minds some of the more obvious facts of our industrial life, and by gaining possession of the headlines and the first page of the newspapers. But to gain this thing they have sacrificed a greater thing. To make their immediate point they have lost all reputation for fairness, have disrupted the Commission, have ignored investigations already begun, and have brought forth a final report which is inadequate, inaccurate, ill-balanced and little short of humiliating. It was a short cut, an attempt to cross fields and reach conclusions agreed upon in advance. The conclusions were reached. Mr. Walsh proved that he could end where he began.

Eight Hours for Work

ON September 15th the twenty-five thousand employees of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey are to go over to an eight-hour work-day. The decision, we are told, was reached by the company voluntarily in accordance with its policy of keeping its wages and working conditions equal to or in advance of wages and working conditions elsewhere. "This reduction in hours [from ten to eight]," says a representative of the company, "was not the result of recent troubles, but was adopted as a part of the welfare work that the company has always been interested in."

We are less interested in the ostensible motive than in the act, and less concerned with this particular act than with the universal tendency towards a shorter working day, of which it is an indication. Of all improvements in labor conditions the shortening of the working day is the most significant. An increase in wages may be nullified by a rise in prices; a reduction in the number of hours, even if it be accompanied by a greater intensity of labor, almost invariably leaves a margin of gain. The working day, once reduced, is seldom extended. Gradually, though slowly, the wage-earner gains for himself a certain measure of leisure, a life beyond his work.

The facts concerning this steady reduction in the working day are not entirely discouraging. We are far better off than we were fifty or seventy years ago. At the beginning of the century, the wage-earner labored from sun to sun, and later, when expensive machinery and artificial light were introduced into the factories, the working day was extended far into the night. In 1840 American cotton operatives worked fourteen hours per day, and as late as 1852 thirteen hours, while to-day the average working day in the mills is under ten hours. The hours of labor of farm laborers, except in harvest times, seem to have diminished, and in a considerable number of occupations, notably in the building trades, an eight-hour day has been introduced. In other occupations, affecting the health of the workers or in which women and children are largely employed, a shorter working day has been secured by legislation. But this progress, though considerable, is not nearly so great as is generally supposed. The ten-hour day still prevails in most industries, while the eleven or twelve-hour day is far from being extinct. During the ten years from 1891 to 1901, the average working day fell only a quarter of an hour. In the last twenty-five years, less than one hour has been taken from the hours of daily labor.

What is still more disheartening is that many of these reductions in hours, even when they have been

clearly to the real interest of employers, have been gained only after breaking down their obstinate resistance. The working day of twelve, fourteen and sixteen hours, from which we have now escaped, was not an ancient custom of the race, but came in with the factory system in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Manufacturers believed that their best interests lay in daily extracting the very last ounce of energy from the worker, irrespective of the effect upon the worker's vitality the next week or year. The expensive machines were there. They had to be run. The wage-earners when worn out could be replaced. And so the more leisurely labor of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, during which the English were noted as "the most diligent lazy people on the face of the earth," gave way to an intense, protracted toil, which robbed the worker entirely of the sunshine. A very old Nottingham framework knitter, who had worked for sixty-nine years at the stocking-frame, testified before the Factory Commission of 1833 that when he began work in 1745 as a lad of ten, the knitters never wrought more than ten hours a day for five days in the week, and kept Saturday free for gardening or whatever else they had to do, but as time went on they were forced to work first twelve, then fourteen and at last fifteen hours every day. In Manchester in the early 'thirties, the textile mills ran from five in the morning to nine in the evening, with no stoppage except an hour for dinner. Yet as early as 1816 Robert Owen had proved by actual experience in his mills at New Lanark that the hours of labor could be reduced from twelve and one-half (and even from sixteen hours) down to ten and one-half, with no sensible decline in the output. The lesson, however, was not learned by Owen's fellow manufacturers, and to-day, ninety-nine years after this great experiment, the vast majority of employers instinctively oppose any reduction of hours, even though the reduction is likely to increase both product and profit.

There is of course a saving minority. In every industrial country individual employers realize that resiliency and initiative count more in the worker than does a mere spiritless labor during a longer working day. These exceptional men grasp the fact that it pays them as employers to draw upon those great reserves of personal efficiency which can only be found in workers enjoying a large measure of leisure. Such far-seeing employers do not fear that a reduction in hours will lead to their being undersold by domestic or foreign competitors, for statistics have tended to reveal a marked economy in short hours as in high wages. From the beginning, therefore, we have always had unknown employers who, like Robert Owen, have opposed themselves to their fellow-manufacturers,

and in their own interest have introduced the shorter working day and agitated for laws reducing the hours of labor throughout the trade. Sometimes they have been animated by the desire for gain; sometimes by philanthropic considerations. Over eighty years ago Owen argued in favor of an eight-hour day, not only because a longer day was unnecessary, but "because it is to the real interest of every human being that every other human being should be healthy, intelligent, contented and wealthy."

If every employer in this country were a Robert Owen, even without his splendid humanitarianism, the working day in our industries would be reduced more in the next month than it was in the last quarter of a century. What faces us, however, in most sections of the employing class, is an absence of that co-operation and *esprit de corps* which would enable the class to carry out big reforms, as well as a total lack of insight into the conditions that make for their own welfare. The work of shortening the working day to a number of hours which will be different for different trades, but will probably approximate eight or perhaps less, must therefore in the first instance be carried on by the organized wage-earners, supported by the more enlightened sentiment of the community. The long struggle for the eight-hour day, which in the United States may be traced as far back as 1842 ("when the carpenters and caulkers in the Charleston navy yard secured eight hours on old work"), must be continued. There must be agitation and strikes and threats of strikes, and the campaign must be carried more effectively than ever into the legislatures of the state and nation. The resistance of employers is likely to be diminished, as in one industry after another an increased output is shown to be compatible with a reduced working day. If industrial commissions can be established in the various states, along the lines suggested by the Commons Report for the Industrial Relations Commission, if representatives of employers and employees may confer with highly trained labor administrators in working out the details of such plans, we may perhaps expect an increased impetus in the movement for shortening the working day.

For the immediate future, however, we dare not be too optimistic. In the stress of the war all the safeguards which formerly protected the laborers of Europe have been taken away, and men who once worked nine or ten hours are now working twelve or fourteen. With the return of peace, the wage-earners in the warring countries will probably labor for longer hours than they have known for a generation, and such a retrogression, if it takes place, may have a retarding influence in this country upon the eight-hour day.

What is Opinion?

A JOURNAL of opinion has always to face the attack of the practical man that it is a mere vehicle for dilettantism, which wastes in expressing sentiments the energy which should go to the presentation of sober fact and sound data. There is far too much opinion at large in the world already, he thinks. What he wants is not more opinion, but a guide out of the fog-bank into some clear light.

Such a practical man flatters too highly most of that comment which passes for opinion in the journals of the day. Most current reactions to the war, have been, for example, not opinion at all, but mere batteries of guns in an emotional warfare. In all the discussion little emerges that is not articulate emotion or articulate group-interest. This variedly articulate anger, disgust, prejudice, moral reaction, has little more right to be termed opinion than the start one gives when one meets a bear. It is instinctive response clothed with words.

Our moulders of opinion—our preachers and politicians and editors and publicists—are not speaking in order so much to convince us as to make us act or vote or feel with them. Their words are chains of phrases strung together almost undesignedly with a view to pulling us to the cause or party or idea they are supporting. It is a curious delusion that words express thought. The object of most words is to short-circuit thought. Phrases like democracy, liberty, militarism, the principles of justice and humanity, are not primarily meanings at all. They are epithets hurled at us to arouse some desired resentment, or they are spotlights guaranteed to create certain warm emotional glows of assent in the mind which receives them. It is the reaction they touch off that makes them significant, not their meaning. Words are such deadly things not because they mean something, but because they get wrapped up with our emotion and pull it out with them when they are seized. In support of the articulate emotion there may be any number of highly rational arguments. But it is not the arguments which have come first. It is the antagonism or the glow of approval, while the evidence has grown almost vegetatively around the emotion. The world is always willing to be fooled in this way. It is always willing to take the ideas at their face value, instead of going straight to the emotional core and discovering the animus that directed the collection of the ideas. The constant danger to the mind that would be intellectual, that would "have opinions," is that it is willing to identify itself or indolently let itself be identified with groups that are not expressing opinion at all, but only articulating their emotion.

Genuine opinion is neither cold, logical judgment

nor irrational feeling. It is scientific hypothesis, to be tested and revised as experience widens. Opinion is a view of a situation based on grounds short of proof. In a valid opinion they must be *just* short of proof. Good opinion is not spasmodic. The mind must have made a very wide sweep, made the complete circuit of the compass. It must first have hunted down the predisposing prejudice and neutralized it, and then bent itself to discovering all the factors that converge upon the situation. A good opinion places the event or person or idea it is judging firmly in a scheme of things. You get its position in a spreading field as well as in a historical chain.

But good opinion is not flabby and uncertain. It is not a "much to be said on both sides." It is a provisional conviction to be held as a conviction until new light alters it. It is an interpretation with a definite slant and bias. But it presses hotly for proof. It strains constantly towards the accuracy of truth. Good opinion, although firm, is the direct opposite of dogma. Dogma is hard and unyielding, a sort of petrified emotion. It is constantly masquerading as proof, as genuine opinion never does. You do not revise dogmas. You smash them. But opinion is flexible and gracious. It does not object to examining itself, to publishing the source of its interpretations. It takes you freely behind the scenes. It is not afraid to show you the foundations of the categories and terms in which it is expressed. It will let the bony framework of its presuppositions stand out rather boldly at times. It invites criticism. It has the scientist's disinterestedness in its own conviction. What it wants is to understand, to get the thing it is judging rightly placed, to grasp its true meaning in the world.

Opinion, however, aims not at a mere static comprehension. It does not merely survey the field with serene Olympian gaze. It is a force, and the only force that can be relied upon in the long run to fortify the will and clear the vision. Conviction, gripped after the widest possible survey of the field, is what we must act upon if we are to effect those social changes which most of us desire. The world has generally preferred to act from logical consistency or from the high elation of feeling rather than upon daring and clear-sighted experiment. The idea of a social and political opinion which, free from moral prejudice, strains towards scientific proof, as the hypotheses of the physicist strain towards physical laws, is still very new, but it is already playing havoc with the old crusted folkways.

If such opinion is to be this force of the future, there cannot be too much of its guiding thread. Yet it constantly becomes not easier but harder to

form valid opinions. We are stunned by the volume of what there is to know in the human world. We are overwhelmed by the mass of sociological data, and brought to despair even more by the great gaps which must be filled. We have every day set before us infinitely more than we can possibly digest. We run the constant risk of missing completely the relevant and the important. Opinion never had a better chance of being based on substrata of quite meaningless facts. The result is often an excessive caution among those whose business it is to know. The universities remain esoteric through the refusal of those who have the wide survey to commit themselves. Those who have the "grounds just short of proof" will not form opinions. Those who will loosely express their opinions have not the grounds. This treason of the intellectual class has neutralized the expected effects of public education. Discussion and universal reading have not really made popular opinion any more intelligent or reliable. They have merely made great masses emotionally articulate, rendered prejudice more vociferous and varied. The need for interpreters, for resolute expressers of opinion, becomes therefore more urgent. Even if real opinion is a Utopian ideal, and no mind can ever make the wide survey and go through the stringent processes necessary to form it, the brave effort must always be made. Its best will not be valueless. To work at breaking up the cake of intellectual custom, at setting the new terms and values that current society needs, at judging events in the light of the larger conceptions of science and the most fruitful social tendencies, will be not to remain entirely futile in the modern world. Quixotic as the enterprise may seem, it is the formation of opinion and not dusty scholarship and solemn cant that will enlist the good-will and best endeavors of those who aim to think worthily.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1915 IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT. ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY WALTER LIPPMANN
PHILIP LITTELL FRANCIS HACKETT
WALTER E. WEYL CHARLOTTE RUDYARD
ALVIN S. JOHNSON

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION, FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE.

REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER. ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

England's Changing War-Mind

IS any change taking place in the mind and temper of the British nation regarding the war?

It is hardly possible to answer this question with any confidence. The organs of public feeling and opinion can hardly be said to exist at present. A censorship mechanically strict, so as to avoid the trouble of discrimination, enforces not only economy of views but of discussion on all matters of real moment relating to the conduct of our allies or of neutral nations. With rare exceptions, such as the attack of the Northcliffe papers upon Lord Kitchener, our daily and weekly press has confined its criticism to issues of immediate political import—recruiting, munitions, hospitals, the war-loan, and the need for saving. Though there is abundant discussion of the changing military scenes, there is a tacit conspiracy to shun the high politics of the situation and to refuse to envisage the possibility of any early termination of the war.

A curious sensitiveness regarding the peace which must some day come is in itself significant. The mingled scorn and indignation poured upon anyone who mentions the word peace is intended to convey the view that the nation is as solidly determined as ever to fight "to a finish," to "crush Germany," and to dictate a settlement, as it was a year ago. The patriotic attitude of press and platform is one of folded arms and immutable determination. Our statesmen and publicists profess unabated confidence in our willingness and our ability to "see it through." They invite the people to display that confidence by increasing sacrifices of life and money, and by a suspension of all those liberties which may be declared by the military authorities to interfere directly or indirectly with the successful prosecution of the war. Parliamentary government has been scrapped, industrial legislation and trade-union regulations for the protection of the workers are suspended. Our children are snatched from the schools to be set to labor, our drinking habits are forcibly curtailed, we walk in dangerously darkened streets, cheap tickets on our railways are not obtainable, many of our seaside resorts are closed to us, we may not paint or sketch out of doors under penalty of arrest. The Defence of the Realm act is a virtual suspension of our political and civil rights.

Now up to the present time there has been an almost complete acquiescence in this suspension of self-government. The stupendous happenings of the war produced at first a submissiveness adapted to all purposes of discipline. Everyone seemed glad to do what he was told and grateful for the word of command. So long as events in the west were fairly

rapid and sensational and a favorable decision seemed attainable at no distant day, the general mind remained tense but uncritical. Though responsible persons talked in public about a protracted war, few persons believed it; our self-confidence supported our impatience in expecting that the Allies would win through this summer. As spring and summer months flowed by, and all hope of breaking through faded, the tension became for the first time painful. There is not the least abatement of our determination, not the least acceptance of the possibility of ultimate failure, but there is a feeling of unacknowledged disappointment that produces irritability of mind. There is a loss of the earlier buoyancy of spirit. The habit of criticism is creeping back. The concealment of important events, the bare nature of the actual chronicle of war, though accepted on grounds of military expediency, serve to damp enthusiasm. A people called upon for such terrible sacrifices craves for fuller knowledge of what is happening and for some light ahead to sustain its confidence. The new presentation of the war as a deadlock to be brought to a slow finish by "the process of attrition" is beginning to have its inevitable effect. There is nothing dramatic and sustaining to the spirit in attrition; the choice of this inhuman term to cover such a human agony appears intolerable, so far as it is realized—and it is beginning to be realized. From every village in England the war has already taken its toll of lives; the unceasing flow of casualties through the daily press is reinforced in the sluggish imagination of our people by the crowded hospitals in all our towns, the maimed figures and the garb of mourning in our streets.

It is true that this loss of life begets no conscious disposition to seek an end of the war. There is no recognised limit to the sacrifices our people think and say they are prepared to make in order to secure victory. Nor can it be held that the punishment inflicted upon Russia this summer favors any early consideration of the possibility of peace. Quite the contrary. It has made us set our teeth and treat with contumely the stories that have been afloat about the "reasonable" terms Germany is prepared to accept. We want no reasonable or even generous terms from Germany; we still volubly and even angrily insist upon continuing the war until we can impose our terms, and we insist that our allies are all as anxious to go on fighting as we are.

But deep down in our hearts we no longer feel the early faith. Though still stubbornly refusing to admit it, even to ourselves, we are suffering disappointment and disillusionment. The confidence expressed

everywhere in public is undermined by private personal communications. The predominant opinion among the better-informed classes holds that in the west a definite success on either side is exceedingly improbable. Nor are we certain that the gain of getting through the Dardanelles, when we do get through, will be so determinant as we formerly imagined, while the offset in lives is ever mounting higher. The Northcliffe criticism of the military policy of the War Office has left deep scars of doubt about the efficiency of our administration, which the hurried crusade for munitions under the banner of Lloyd George has not served to erase. The sight of great bodies of men enlisted six months ago or more, but still unfurnished with rifles, has a depressing effect. People complain, of course quite unreasonably, of the slowness of the war, and the newspaper placards with their ruthlessly mendacious headlines now only evoke a torpid incredulity.

To the damaging effects of the words "attrition" and "exhaustion" must be added the still more weakening influence of the word "economy." I say "the word" advisedly, for it has hardly yet begun to translate itself into deed. Though the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other serious persons have set before us the necessity of doubling the amount of our national savings, in order to furnish the sinews of war, we have as a nation done little more than think about the process. And the more we think the less we like it. The word is getting on our nerves. Ingenuous persons write to the press complaining how hard it is for them to save, and how hard it will be for others if they should cease to spend the money. We are all of us anxious to economize, but we do not know how to do it; hence a sense of frustration, in itself demoralizing.

Nor are our feelings relieved by the shadow of impending taxation. For the great war loan has by no means filled the voracious jaws of war; to the toll of lives must be added a heavy toll of property. Now it is not cynicism but plain observation of human nature which suggests that loss of property disturbs the mind even more than loss of life. It is not a question of comparative values, but of capacity for adjustment. The blow inflicted by the sudden death upon the battlefield of a son or other relative falls with incomparably greater pain upon the feelings and leaves a deeper wound. But the effect of heavy taxation, demanding a large and lasting alteration in the standard of living, is more difficult to accept in a spirit of resignation. So strong is the dominion of property.

The accumulative effect of these causes is a weariness of war. In every nation it is secretly sapping the earlier enthusiasm and confidence, and is preparing a state of mind which may make peace possible. The elderly gentlemen who in every land conduct "the

affairs of state," fear lest this weariness should grow into an active desire for a peace which to their minds is premature and inconclusive. Following this lead, editors and other tools of government are incited to a vehement denial that any of the changes I here describe are taking place, or that anybody wants any sort of peace that seems attainable. Even radical journals like the *Daily News* and the *New Statesman* greet the reported experiments in peace proposals on the part of Germany with an irate refusal of consideration, irrespective of their terms. This deliberate and persistent stoking-up testifies to a secret fear that the fire of the war fever may be sinking.

It is sinking. The minds of large numbers of people among the middle and the working classes are beginning timidly to turn towards considering the possibility of peace. This is why our jingo press, led by such papers as the *Morning Post* and the *Daily Express*, have been of late inciting mobs to break up the meetings of organizations suspected of the crime of talking peace, and why Members of Parliament have been urging the government to stamp out the remnant of the rights of public meeting and freedom of the press. This is why our conscriptionists are redoubling their efforts to stampede the government and the nation into a final abandonment of the voluntary system, which has already furnished a larger army than we have been able to arm, clothe and pay for. Our "Prussians" are aware that a voluntary army and a free nation will insist upon exercising some rights of determining when and upon what terms the war may be brought to a settlement. A war of attrition they justly calculate is only possible when the subjects of attrition have been deprived of every effective element of protest. Hence the struggle to get a military autocracy so firmly established in this country that the voice of the attrited shall count for nothing in determining the policy of the war.

Do not mistake the result of my analysis. There is no present movement anywhere in this country for concluding peace at any early date, and no belief that in her present state of power Germany is likely to offer terms that could be deemed acceptable. But the time may come when, whatever the immediate military situation, Germany will be willing to offer or accept terms which, though not ideally desirable, will appear more tolerable to our people than a further continuance of attrition. It is the dread of this so-called "inconclusive peace" which obsesses our jingo journalists and makes them desire so thoroughly to Prussianize our institutions as to render such a result impossible. The true meaning of this term "inconclusive peace" has been set forth recently in the columns of THE NEW REPUBLIC with such admirable precision by Professor Alvin S. Johnson that I need add nothing here, except to say

that it stands to-day among us as the great example of what Ruskin in a famous passage designated "masked words": "There are masked words abroad, I say, which nobody understands, but which everybody uses, and most people will also fight for, live for or even die for, fancying they mean this or that or other of the things dear to them. There never were creatures of prey so mischievous, never

diplomatists so cunning, never poisoners so deadly, as these masked words; they are the unjust stewards of all men's ideas; whatever fancy or favorite instinct a man most cherishes he gives to his favorite masked word to take care of for him; the word at last comes to have an infinite power for him—you cannot get at him but by its ministry."

London.

J. A. HOBSON.

The Matter With Russia

THERE are two reasons for the tremendous defeat of Russia's splendid armies—lack of industrial organization and lack of popular education. After the scandalous revelations of the Japanese War the Russian government decided to create a new army. They did create it, but its foundations were soft. They built their house on sand. Soukhomlinoff was the builder. To-day, in forced retirement, he sees the whole fabric giving way. He is not to blame; he has simply become the scapegoat for the sins of the Russian Empire.

For Soukhomlinoff did not understand the problem any more than the rest of Europe did. It was his plan to eliminate dishonesty. He succeeded. It was his plan to create a standing army of 1,500,000 men and an equal number of active reserves, and a further large reserve of some military value; to clothe, arm and equip with first-class artillery a force of three million men, and to maintain large reserves of ammunition for such a force; to expedite the Russian system of military mobilization, and to build a network of military railroads for the defense of Russian Poland. In all this Soukhomlinoff succeeded, with the single exception of the Polish railroads.

In 1906 Austria annexed the Slav provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the attitude of Germany on that occasion made the great war—from Russia's point of view—inevitable. From the year 1906 Russia's preparations were directed against the Central Empires alone.

Soukhomlinoff intended, in the event of war, which he hoped for the sake of the Polish railroads to postpone until 1916, to invade Galicia, seize Cracow, and eventually break through the Carpathians into Hungary. Meanwhile the Russian forces moving north from Cracow would oblige Germany to retreat from Poland, which was expected to be invaded, and eventually from East Prussia as far as the Vistula. Soukhomlinoff knew that he could beat the Austrians. Of the Germans he was not so sure, and Buda Pest not Berlin was his objective. He was willing to let the French conquer Germany while the Russians conquered Austria.

When the war broke out in August, 1914, everything went according to Russian schedule. Soukhomlinoff's immense armies mobilized quickly; they were better equipped than any other army except the Germans; the Russian artillery overwhelmed the Austrians. Galicia was easily occupied and Cracow threatened. The point upon which I insist is that Russia, from a military standpoint, was next to Germany the best prepared nation in Europe at the beginning of the war. From a social and industrial standpoint she was the worst prepared.

Russia's weakness began to show at once. Called upon to improvise a campaign in East Prussia for France's sake, she failed as early as August, 1914. For Russia cannot improvise. Beaten at Tannenberg, Soukhomlinoff's organization returned to its original plans. Three great defensive battles, one at Augustowo, two in West Poland, were on the whole Russian victories. Przemyśl in Galicia fell. The Carpathian passes were occupied.

But meanwhile England and France had, with their superior intelligence, plainly realized that as matters stood they could not possibly take the offensive against Germany. Not only was military organization necessary, but also social and industrial organization on a state-wide scale never hitherto imagined. Months, perhaps years, were needed; and so England and France dug their soldiers in and began the work—which in Germany had been already done—behind the lines.

Russia, too, saw the task, but it was a task beyond her national ability. It was like asking a schoolboy to solve a problem in integral calculus. All she could do was to entrench her armies against Germany, as previously planned, and to attack the weaker Austrians. But after six months of war, ammunition began to give out, the Austrians gained a breathing space, and by the first of April the campaign in the Carpathians reached a deadlock.

By this time Hindenburg and Mackensen had discovered the Russian weakness. First, the standard of Russian officers had been terribly lowered, as the Germans found out from prisoners. The

supply of officers in all armies is limited, and promotions must be made from the ranks. But the Russian non-commissioned officers and men, like eighty per cent of the Russian nation, can neither read nor write. An officer who cannot read and write is just about as much use in a modern army as he would be in the employ of the Standard Oil Company. Therefore the Germans realized that while such a personnel might manage to carry on a defensive war in trenches, they would stand no chance at all in the complicated manoeuvres of open fighting. The Russians' sin of restraining education because of its "unsettling" effect on the popular mind had certainly found them out.

Secondly, Hindenburg and Mackensen knew that the Russian ammunition was running low. Before the war, Germans and Russians alike believed that the war was bound to be a short one, and alike believed that enough ammunition for six months was enough ammunition. Within a few weeks every staff in Europe realized that the war was going to be long, and Germany, Austria, France, Italy and England began to devote half their energies to making ammunition. But when it came to industrial mobilization poor Russia, best prepared at the outset with her French shells built with French money, gasped and quit. She simply had not reached that stage of civilization where industrial mobilization is possible. And no nation which cannot face that problem will ever win a serious war again.

The campaign which began in May at Tarnov and Gorlice, and which is still going on, was lost before it was begun. For Russia it is an awful tragedy. The Russian soldier, as brave, as enduring, as well disciplined a soldier as lives in the world to-day, has fought with a loyalty which ought to command the admiration of the ages. He has died—whole armies of him—fighting riflemen with clubs. And he is fighting still.

There is only one thing which the Grand Duke Nicholas can do now, and that is to retire in as good order as he can, and to hope that the Germans will stop. In the present state of feeling the Russian armies will retire, still fighting, to the Ural Mountains.

Everything therefore depends on the German plans. Hindenburg's plans—the simple plans of a soldier—will simply be to reduce the military power, by disintegration or capture, as low as he can, and in that endeavor he is no doubt prepared to advance any distance. But from a political standpoint the German government has probably other plans.

Germany wishes first Poland, which she already has won. She would like to make it a buffer state under a princeling of the house of Hapsburg. Secondly she wishes Bessarabia, to give to Rumania.

This province the Austrians will probably try to occupy, with raids in the direction of Kiev, the capital of Little Russia, for Kiev is said to be a hotbed of insurrection against the Czar. Very likely this will not be more than a raid, as neither Austria nor Germany desires Little Russia. Thirdly, Germany would like the Baltic provinces of Courland, already taken, Livonia, and Esthonia as far as the shores of the Gulf of Finland. These three provinces were once under the rule of the Teutonic Knights, a sentimental reason for their occupation; but in addition the upper classes there are of German descent and German sympathies. Nor is Petrograd far away from the Esthonian border, and I believe the political aims of the German campaign are Petrograd and Odessa.

But Hindenburg is hard to control; the disorganization of the Russian armies cannot at this distance be calculated; and there is no doubt that if military objects prevail over political ones, the German campaign will follow the Russian armies wherever they may go.

GERALD MORGAN.

A Court for the Garment Trades

RECENT disturbances in the garment trades of New York City, though they do not mean the ill-omened failure of a well-chosen method of advance toward industrial democracy, clearly demonstrate lack of complete adjustment in the machinery of the protocol. If the general method of experiment had not been sound, the protocol could not have lasted so long, nor would it have been so promptly succeeded by a new agreement. Nevertheless its breakdown shows the need and offers the opportunity of devising remedies for its defects.

Two of these defects—lack of a method of enforcement capable of inspiring confidence in both parties, and lack of control over unorganized employers and wage-earners—are inherent in any system which depends entirely upon the authority of voluntary associations. Both employers and wage-earners complain of the method by which the protocol was enforced. Both employers and wage-earners, moreover, see in unorganized members of the trade a menacing source of unregulated competition.

The machinery of enforcement evidently needs to be strengthened, and at the same time to be adapted to some method of imposing upon all employers and workers in the trade, unorganized as well as organized, the standards set up in the agreement. Two years ago the British Industrial Council reported that it was necessary for the success of any trade agreement to devise some method of securing substantial uniformity of standards throughout the in-

dustry, and recommended a plan for the extension of an agreement, entered into by an employers' association and a union, to the entire trade in the particular locality. In New York State the Industrial Commission might be authorized, under suitable conditions, to declare a collective agreement applicable to all persons engaged in the industry.

If, however, a collective agreement entered into voluntarily by an employers' association and a union were extended by state action to an entire trade, the state could not leave its enforcement wholly to private organizations. A court organized and maintained by the parties to the agreement could not possibly furnish a satisfactory or equitable means of settling disputes between employers and employees not voluntarily subject to its conditions. Only a court established by the state, with judges elected by all persons concerned, regardless of membership in any organization, would furnish a suitable machine for enforcement of such an agreement.

Is it not possible that the development of this new form of voluntary contract has brought with it actual need for correlative judicial machinery? Obviously our present court system and its methods are woefully unfitted to handle disputes arising under a trade agreement. Courts in the hands of lawyers, whose training and experience almost necessarily preclude personal contact with industrial processes and labor conditions, must inevitably fail when confronted with the complex problems of modern industry. Recognition of this fact is shown not only in our protests against judicial interference with legislative acts, but even more markedly in the recent tendency toward giving judicial functions to bodies of experts on particular industrial problems. Employers' liability cases, for example, are being taken out of the regular courts and placed in the hands of industrial accident boards. We are beginning to realize that the varied economic relationships of today raise certain classes of conflicting interests, the equitable adjustment of which, though requiring only the most elementary knowledge of law, necessitates close acquaintance with facts, and not infrequently with the entire technique of an industrial process.

This need for specialized judicial machinery adapted to the settlement of disputes between employers and wage-earners is met in Europe by industrial courts in which half of the judges are employers elected by employers of their respective industries, and half wage-earners elected by wage-earners of the same industries. These courts have existed for over a hundred years in France and have spread to Germany, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Spain, and most of the cantons of Switzerland. In France nearly two hundred "Conseils de Prud'hommes" settle annually some 50,000 disputes, about half of

them in Paris; and in Germany fully 125,000 cases pass each year through more than four hundred and fifty "Gewerbegerichte." Many of these disputes seem petty, for they usually involve only small sums—occasionally not more than five cents measured in our money. But these sums are probably as important to the low-paid wage-earners who bring the vast majority of complaints as are thousands of dollars to the average business man. The opportunity offered the European workingman to secure, quickly and at a cost commensurate with his means, judicial consideration of his most trivial complaints, has doubtless healed many a grievance which might otherwise have grown into a source of industrial unrest.

The essential feature of all European industrial courts is the election of panels of employers and workingmen to serve as judges in cases arising within their own industries. The courts are of two distinct types. The French type is composed of an equal number of employers and wage-earners. The German type contains, in addition to an equal number of employers and wage-earners, a government official—not necessarily a lawyer—who acts as president and casts the deciding vote in case of a tie.

The role of the lawyer is reduced in these courts to a minimum, not only on the bench but at the bar. In Germany, indeed, no lawyer is permitted to appear before an industrial court. In France lawyers rarely appear except as representatives of large employers or corporations. The questions settled are matters of fact. No lawyer is expected either to argue or to decide whether a seam is straight or crooked.

Complainants present their cases, and defendants reply in person. The judges, by questions, draw out of half-articulate or muddled parties as clear a story as possible. In a clothing trades' case a bundle of garments may be spread out for inspection on the judicial "bench." Not infrequently men get excited and shake their fists in each other's faces. Women, who appear and tell their grievances in exactly the same way as men, sometimes have recourse to aprons to dry their tears, and sometimes lose their tempers, as did the Paris workingwoman whom the writer heard violently denounce the entire court as unjust. Yet the decisions, coming from judges who really know what the parties have been talking about, are usually accepted with grace.

Another important feature of industrial courts is the division of their proceedings into two stages—first conciliation, and second, arbitration or decision. In France no case can come before the court for arbitration until after conciliation has been attempted. In Germany the president of the court holds preliminary hearings for conciliation. Something like four-fifths, and sometimes even nine-tenths, of the dis-

putes brought to industrial courts are settled by conciliation.

The decisions of these courts were originally based on the "customs of the trade," which were interpreted to govern, in the absence of written agreements, all labor contracts. But within recent years collective agreements between organizations of employers and wage-earners have become more and more important as definite statements of standards to be enforced. In Geneva a separate branch of the Conseil de Prud'hommes is organized for the settlement of strikes and impending strikes. The German courts, too, are directed by law to organize mediation in collective disputes. As a result, hundreds of trade agreements which have been entered into, directly or indirectly, under the guidance or through the influence of industrial courts, are on file in the archives of these courts in Geneva, Berlin, and many other European cities.

A trade agreement is not, however, essential to the existence of an industrial court. Clear-headed interpretation of the mutual rights and obligations of employers and wage-earners, by persons officially elected to represent the two interests involved and thoroughly competent to understand the facts described, is their essential function. A trade agreement defines these rights and obligations. But Conseils de Prud'hommes were conducted successfully long before formal trade agreements were invented. And even in this country, where custom is not so definitely fixed as in France, a group of employers and wage-earners acting together as judges of an industrial court would doubtless find that they could agree upon minimum standards for their trade.

At the same time, as such a court would be an official institution which could not be abolished at will, it would exert steady pressure in the direction of a trade agreement. Employers and workingmen would be obliged to meet frequently for discussion of disputes arising in their trade, and difficulties encountered in arriving at decisions would constantly emphasize the need for a written agreement. The less definite the customs of the trade, the more would organizations, both of employers and of employees, be needed to enter into collective agreements establishing trade standards, and the more likely would an industrial court be to guarantee the existence of such organizations.

The clothing industry is peculiarly difficult to govern, partly because of the large number of employers and establishments, and partly because of the comparatively small degree of skill required. It is in just this type of industry, however, that the industrial court system has in practice proved most successful. The plan has not worked so well in highly concentrated industries, where it is difficult to secure disinterested employers as judges and where work-

ing people often fear the boycott. But to the clothing industry, with its many employers and its comparative mobility of labor, particularly in a large city like New York, industrial courts seem peculiarly adapted.

Many questions arise, of course, as to the organization of such a system. If the plan called for extension of collective agreements to an entire trade, what authority should decree the extension? What conditions ought an agreement to fulfill before it could be extended? Over what classes of cases should the industrial court have jurisdiction? Should the number of judges be even, as in France, or odd, as in Germany? How should elections be conducted? In what class of cases and under what conditions should appeals to other courts be allowed? Upon these and many other questions of detail the experience of the various European countries which have long had courts of this character would be invaluable.

If collective agreements are to be a successful method of advance toward industrial democracy, must not the state recognize their reasonable standards and establish public tribunals for the enforcement of such standards throughout entire industries? If our judicial machinery is to meet the needs created by this new form of social compact, must not its basis be broadened by admitting to the sacred bench of the judge, not only experts in the law, but also experts in the hard, sordid conditions of wage labor?

HELEN L. SUMNER.

Margaret Derenzy

I HAD never heard of Margaret Derenzy, "that fair and gifted widowed wife," until a certain afternoon spent in an old-fashioned country-house near Philadelphia. Outside, a dispiriting winter thaw was in progress. There was nothing for it but tobacco, an easy chair, and a book. What book? Surely in so antique a mansion I might be able to discover (say in an upper chamber) a discredited bookcase containing the cast-off literature of our ancestors. Not the solemn, self-perpetuating classics, but some specimens of once-popular authors whose genius had not been able to go the pace of more febrile times. The house was deserted, I began to rummage, and lo! a thin little volume bound in maroon levant:

A WHISPER TO A NEWLY-MARRIED PAIR FROM
A WIDOWED WIFE

FIFTH AMERICAN EDITION, PUBLISHED
BY E. L. CAREY & A. HART, CHESTNUT
STREET, PHILADELPHIA, 1833.

The contents of that volume is divided into four parts, and the first is not the least interesting. It is

a "Biography of the Authoress" written by the "editor of the *Irish Shield*." Remain:

"A Whisper to the Husband. . ."

"A Whisper to the Wife. . ."

"Poems. . ."

I have studied these four parts with care. They fascinate me. Margaret herself fascinates me. She was a blue-stocking in the days when female stockings were often amazingly blue. But she was also, we must suppose, a breathing woman, and, as the editor of the *Irish Shield* will tell us, a most unhappy one.

"If," he writes, "we cannot weave a perennial garland of Parnassian laurels to decorate her tomb, we can, at least, pluck up the rank weeds that hide the tablet on which her epitaph is inscribed, and light a sepulchral lamp before her biographical shrine, to dispel the gloom of obscurity. . . . The lady whose genius has enriched our literature, and whose writings, fraught with exalted feelings, have added another plume to the chaplet of female talent, was the daughter of Anthony Graves of Thomastown, in the county of Kilkenny, of which beautiful and romantic village. . . ."

"Her stature was elegantly symmetrical, tall and graceful, and possessing that rotundity of outline which is so much admired in the Grecian statues. Few faces, even in Kilkenny, the Iona of lovely women, presented the mingled sweets of the lily and the rose, in such freshness of bloom, as that of Margaret Graves. Her fine black eyes, beaming with intelligence, threw a halo. . . . The snow-like whiteness of her bosom was exquisitely contrasted and set off by the luxuriant profusion of brown hair, that floated over it in graceful and curling festoons."

She began to write elegies at an early age, and her fame and beauty "attracted around her a brilliant circle of suitors." Then, in her sixteenth year, "Major Derenzy came, recommended to her partiality by the manliness of his person and the fame of his exploits in Spain and Portugal." Also, in the true manner of Desdemona, by "the sorcery of his conversation." They were married.

"But perfect happiness rests on a summit of bliss that is inaccessible to humanity. Major Derenzy, though passionately fond of his lady, and although conscious that her beauties and her virtues were peculiarly calculated to irradiate the sphere of domestic life—still his inconstant heart, initiated in the school of Continental vices, strayed from the only shrine it ought to have worshipped, into the mazes of illicit passion, and the syren grounds of forbidden love."

Briefly, he seduced a "young and fashionable lady" and "eloped with his paramour to Paris."

Turn for an instant to the "Poems." The first stanzas begin not unfamiliarly:

Fare thee well! alas! for ever!

Once this heart was all thy home;

Now thrown back, no longer cherished,

Scorned, rejected, and alone—

It faints; and never, never will it

Reassume its former tone. . . .

The lady's defeat in love is thus acknowledged. Following upon it she retired to the "sequestered mansion of her brother William . . . where she at once indulged her muse and her melancholy." Here she wrote a novel, entitled "The Old Irish Knight." Here too she wrote her successful "Whisper," and a "Parnassian Geography" in verse, for the instruction of young ladies.

Need we add that she died of consumption and a broken heart?

We have seen that Margaret came of a family of some little consequence. Her mother, had she lived to-day, would have been a feminist. She *was* a feminist. She did her utmost to force Margaret's precocious gifts. And the black-eyed Margaret took kindly to a superficial culture that must have developed her romantic self-consciousness at a tender age. She seems early to have seized on the idea of herself as a Celtic Muse, beautiful in mind and person, with her rotundity of outline, her curling festoons, her music and painting, her French and Italian, and her knack of scribbling imitative rhymes.

She perfectly foreknew her destiny. Her destiny was to make a brilliant marriage. At the appointed hour she would fall desperately in love with the divinest of men; he would woo her on his knees; she would droop forward upon his bosom. . . .

Meanwhile her father and mother saw to it that only men of "fortune and respectability" should frequent her. They, too, had foreknowledge of her destiny.

So Major Derenzy came.

This Major Derenzy—his very name marks him a hero of romance—could hardly have been young or he would not have been a Major. I read him forty, well set up, with the fame of his exploits in Spain and Portugal visible upon him. Now, having lived and loved and seen hard service, he will settle down and found a line to carry on the fortune and respectability of the Derenzys. And lo! a Celtic Muse of eligibility, possessing that rotundity of outline so much admired in the best statues. I read the Major a man with an eye for outlines.

"For some years after their marriage their lives exhibited a living picture of conjugal happiness, sweetened and exalted by the charms of rural retirement." Some years—and the line of the Derenzys is not yet founded. The Major has discovered that his Celtic Muse wears stockings of a most violent blue. The Major is living in the country, retired; and the Major has always been a man of action. One doesn't in any way forgive him, but one begins to understand.

As the wicked French say, in the school of whose

vices the Major's heart had early been "initiated," one thing leaps to the eyes. His fault was deliberate. He was not victimized by an adventuress. His fault was conquest, conquest of a "young and fashionable lady," whom the forsaken Margaret calls "Julia." She too was enjoying the charms of rural retirement, and we may safely guess that the Major's fault began with a casual flirtation, pricked on by those sad little imps of boredom, Beelzebub's choicest messengers.

The Major's Muse was after all but a precocious child. Adulation is not good for the infant mind, and during the ardors of courtship Major Derenzy had doubtless praised and overpraised her jejune verses. Quite naturally he had done his best to stimulate her romantic sensibilities. He may from time to time have mingled his tears with hers. Of course he had not the least intention of going on with this *comédie larmoyante* after marriage. Equally of course poor Margaret thought he would continue to play it with her through time and eternity. How does the forsaken Margaret moralize her catastrophe?

"Study your husband's temper and character; and be it your pride and pleasure to conform to his wishes. Check *at once* the *first* advances to contradiction, even of the most *trivial* nature. I repeat the word *trivial*, for it is really inconceivable the power which the *veriest trifles* have, *at times*, over the mind, either in *irritating* or *pleasing*."

"Particularly shun what the world calls, in ridicule, 'Curtain lectures.' When you both enter your room at night and shut to your door, endeavor to shut out at the same moment all discord and contention."

Again:

"You may be united to a man of a most uncongenial mind, who, though a very good sort of husband, differs from you in every sentiment. What of this?—You must only make the best of it. Look around. Numbers have the same, and infinitely worse complaints to make."

"You must only make the best of it. Look around!" But this serpent wisdom came too late. The Major is off with the undisciplined Julia.

Let me now briefly give the philosophical gist of Margaret's "Whisper." ". . . the sincere warning of one who unjustly suffered under the infliction of matrimonial discord and infidelity." It is not so moral as she meant it to be; it is naïvely cynical and human. She realizes clearly that to a woman marriage means an unending struggle to retain the love of a naturally inconstant male. Marriage (she implies) was ordained by heaven for the continuance of the race, and had man remained innocent it might have proved an agreeable institution. But, under present conditions, it is rather a trial of skill than a blessing. It is "the

long and dreary road that lies through the wilderness of life;" also "a chain, the links of which no human power can break." For a woman there is only one thing worse than marriage—spinsterhood. Yet if a woman is clever enough, if she foresees all the dangers, she can often succeed in creating within the bonds of matrimony a very fair imitation of peace. To do this she must realize from the start that her husband is an "opponent," that everything depends upon her power to outwit him. Everything, in short, depends on a woman's power to read her husband, while preventing him from reading her, or knowing that he himself is being read.

"When once you enter the matrimonial state, gentle lady, prepare for the various trials of temper which each day will produce. . . . At the present moment your husband thinks you the loveliest of beings. Destroy not the illusion!"

"Men are naturally more thoughtful and more difficult to please than women. A man will be very apt to seek elsewhere for those smiles which he finds not in his own house."

"In the article of dress, study your husband's taste. The opinion of others on this subject is of very little consequence."

"An admired writer says, 'Let it never be forgotten that, during the whole of life, beauty must suffer no diminution from inelegance, but every charm must contribute to keep the heart which it has won. Whatever would have been concealed as a defect from the lover, must, with greater diligence, be concealed from the husband.'"

"Endeavor to feel pleased with your husband's bachelor friends."

"At dinner—have his favorite dish dressed and served up in the manner he likes best."

"Perhaps your husband may occasionally bring home an unexpected guest. This is not at all times convenient. But beware, gentle lady, beware of frowns!"

"If possible, let your husband suppose you think him a *good* husband. . . . As long as he thinks he possesses the character, he will take some pains to deserve it."

Since Margaret's day a good deal of water has gone under the bridge. While the health of the marriage state is not at present entirely satisfactory, I am much mistaken if it be not considerably more so now than a hundred years ago. Man had not then even started "to round Cape Turk," nor woman to insist that he do so. To-day, oddly enough, the more directly woman competes with man, the more surely does she come to regard him not as an opponent but as an ally. Margaret's philosophy grows antiquated, though still extant. But one thing must be acknowledged. The free woman of to-day is a true descendant of the blue-stockings of the past. We smile at their memory, but we smile respectfully.

LEE WILSON DODD.

The German Polity

NOTHING has proved more baffling to the American seeking to understand European affairs than the German political system, with its seemingly incongruous juxtaposition of a *jure divino* kingship, and a legislature elected by universal manhood suffrage. The journalists, with their largely extemporized information, have been of slight assistance in explaining this apparent disharmony, and only little enlightenment has come from professional scholars, who have in the main relied upon the texts describing the legal framework, but have been unable to gauge the forces that determine its life. If one is not confined to the mother-tongue, the elusive explanation may be found in a hitherto untranslated German book by Hans Delbrueck, entitled "Government and the Will of the People."

This work, published in 1914 before the outbreak of the war, in its short compass of a scant two hundred pages gives us so deep an insight into the forces that are dominant in German political life that it deserves to rank with Bernhardt's "Germany and the Next War," Buelow's "Imperial Germany," Rohrbach's "Der Deutsche Gedanke," and Reventlow's "Deutschlands Auswaertige Politik," each of which in its particular sphere is equally illuminating. As professor of history in the University of Berlin and as Treitschke's successor in the editorial chair of the "Preussische Jahrbuecher," Delbrueck always commands attention. His historical interests cover a broad field, and his aim ever is to understand the inner significance of the events he narrates and of the institutions he describes. He is, however, a typical product of the Prussian school of historians in that, while writing of the past, his eye at the same time ranges over the present and peers into the future. In addition to being an historian, he is also a politician—always a dangerous, and at times a disastrous, combination for the scholar. He has not only taken an active part in political life, but has written extensively on current questions. His influence as a publicist is closely parallel to that enjoyed by Bryce in England.

Delbrueck approaches his theme with the proposition that there is everywhere to-day the demand that the people should govern itself by means of alternating parties and that the will of the people should be given expression and should determine the will of the state. But, he asks, is this in a literal sense feasible? The representative system, as it is constituted in America, England, and other democratic countries, he finds, does not afford an accurate expression of the popular will. Nor does he think that proportional representation, the referendum, the ini-

tiative or any other device whatsoever can remedy this defect, because of the fundamental fact that the will of the people is pure spirit and, as such, is not susceptible of physical embodiment in institutions. As the will of the people cannot be determined by means of voting, no matter what devices are adopted, hence the assumption that it finds expression in popularly elected legislatures is an illusion and a fiction. Furthermore, as a people cannot possess an organ for the expression of its will, it cannot know what it wills. From this it follows inevitably that the conception of popular sovereignty is also mere fiction, for if the people has no will that can be embodied in political institutions, so it cannot possess sovereignty, which is the highest will subject only to its own self-imposed limitations.

Delbrueck does not reject all principles of democracy and attempt to prove them absurd. He recognizes that the elective principle serves a fundamentally useful purpose, in that it brings great masses of the citizens into direct volitional relations with the state and its purposes. Although such a relation is not essential to the nature of the state, yet its strength is increased when the will of each citizen comes to the support of the state-will. In this connection Delbrueck points out that Bismarck needed the support of the people for his great plan of national unity and consequently he established representative institutions. The Reichstag was created to strengthen the government and to support its policies, while in all other states where similar legislatures exist, especially in England, France and America, these attained power by pushing aside or overturning the existing governments.

Thus, according to Delbrueck, the prevailing idea that democratic legislatures embody the will of the people is "an optical delusion." But if they do not represent the people, whom do they represent? On the strength of the investigations of such students and critics of modern democracy as Hasbach, Ostrogorski and Belloc, he maintains that these legislatures are really chosen by the oligarchies in control of the party machinery. He recognizes that public opinion is a corrective agency, but he underestimates its potency, presumably because in Germany this is so insignificant a force. Nor, in spite of the stress that he lays upon the inadequacy of democratic institutions, does he deny that a country such as England enjoys popular government. His contention is virtually limited to the fact that such government is not contingent upon representative institutions and may exist under an autocratic régime.

This system of parliamentary government, whose

basis has thus been analyzed with ruthless logic, obtains in America and throughout western Europe. Between it and the German polity Delbrueck draws a sharp contrast. In diametrical opposition to the unitary parliamentarian of France and England is the dualistic constitutionalism of Germany. The historical analogy of the German system, Delbrueck finds in republican Rome. In the Roman dualistic constitution, he claims, a settlement was never reached between two opposing principles, and the question was never decided where the sovereign power lay. Similarly to-day in the German Empire constitutional lawyers are strenuously debating whether sovereignty rests with the separate heads of the federal states, with the Empire, with the Emperor, or jointly with the federal princes. The problem, in Delbrueck's eyes, is insoluble, but he adds: "The Roman example may console us for that, provided the German people is in other respects successfully led. A strong authority by the grace of God and the will of the great mass, both constantly in mutual interaction, remaining permanently in suspended equilibrium, that made the strength of Rome and gave her first the dominion over the Latin stock, then over Italy and finally over the world."

The German dualism of to-day, according to Delbrueck, consists of two such factors. On the one hand, the Emperor together with the federal princes represents an historical force of independent vitality, the power of legitimate authority, authority "by the grace of God," which is exercised through the two governing organisms, the body of officials and the corps of officers of the army. Side by side with this organized governmental force is the popularly elected Reichstag, "an exceedingly powerful organ of control and criticism, whose assent cannot be dispensed with." What is the position of this legislature in the German polity? Shortly after its creation Liebknecht described it as merely the fig-leaf of naked absolutism, and ever since, German liberals have insistently called the system one of sham constitutionalism. Delbrueck concedes that the legislatures in such states as Great Britain have far greater power in that they determine the government while the Reichstag only influences it. This influence, he shows, is not negligible in that the Reichstag works assiduously in the elaboration and formulation of projects submitted to it. Occasionally, also, it embodies its own ideas in these legislative enactments, and not infrequently it rejects important proposals of the government. Moreover, Prince von Buelow had to retire from the Chancellorship primarily because he could no longer control the Reichstag, and if we are to trust Delbrueck's circumstantial account, Bismarck's dismissal was fundamentally due to the same cause.

Although Delbrueck successfully combats the

claims of those who contend that the Reichstag is a nullity, he frankly admits that its function is one purely of criticism and control. Its work is fundamentally negative in character. It does not shape the policy of the government, nor does it determine its actions. Its insignificance becomes patent when the potency of the other factor in the dualistic system is considered. Buelow has characterized Germany as a state of soldiers and officials, and it is through these two organic groups that the Crown, as Delbrueck has pointed out, exercises its historical powers based upon ultra-mundane sanctions. Like most Germans, Delbrueck founds his political philosophy upon force. The state is power and in it are various forces—the mass of the people, capital, church, and army. Obviously the real power lies in weapons, and as Delbrueck views it the decisive question for the inner character of a state is therefore always: "Whom does the army obey?"

In countries like England or France, it is of course a minister responsible to parliament. But such an arrangement, according to Delbrueck, would be inconceivable in Germany. "Whoever has only the slightest feeling with our corps of officers and our staff of generals knows that that is an impossibility, that our army would first have to experience a Sedan in an inverse sense in order to allow that to befall it." The German army consists of three parts: first, the professional soldiers, that is, the body of officers; secondly, the constantly changing mass of laymen who are being trained to arms; thirdly, the non-commissioned officers, who serve as a link between the first two. The spirit of the corps of officers, which determines the spirit of the entire army, has been essentially the same for centuries. Delbrueck traces it back to the days of the early Teutonic tribes described by Caesar and Tacitus. Each of their chieftains was surrounded by a following—*comitatus*—of faithful warriors, who were bound to him in personal and unbreakable loyalty. This personal relation persisted through feudal days and is conspicuous in the standing armies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The officers and soldiers of the Prussian army served Frederick the Great, not as their territorial lord, but as their *kriegsherr*, their war lord. Their loyalty and fidelity was a personal one, to him, not to the state, with which their relation was only mediate. This personal relation of the army to the war lord perdures in modern Germany. As Delbrueck writes, this is the foundation of the German political system, even though it is not formulated in any paragraph of the constitution. According to him, this personal relation is the greatest force in the state, and could be destroyed only by terrible military defeat. The nature of the kingship is determined, not by the functions allotted to it in the constitution, but by its relations to the army.

After having described the preëminent position occupied by the army in the German political system, Delbrueck turns to that other organ through which the *jure divino* monarchy exercises its powers—the body of officials designated by unsympathetic critics as the bureaucracy. While this body, says our exponent, is not so direct an instrument of power as the army, it is still an instrument for the exercise of power. This body of officials, which obeys the king just as the army does and which has spread its organism over the entire people, ultimately transfers to the Crown every political decision. “How doc-

trinaire must one be to shut one's eyes to this fact!” exclaims Delbrueck.

This, in brief outline, is Delbreuck's analysis of the nature of the Germany polity. It is a system unknown to English-speaking peoples since the seventeenth century, and one from which they have emancipated themselves at the cost of much strife and sacrifice. Were Americans to regard it sympathetically, they would be false to themselves and would have to forswear all the political ideals of which their history is an embodiment.

GEORGE LOUIS BEER.

CORRESPONDENCE

Mr. Manly Takes Issue

SIR: The utter failure of THE NEW REPUBLIC to understand and interpret correctly the report of the staff of the Commission on Industrial Relations would be incomprehensible if there were not internal evidence to show that it arose from a simple failure to read even the press abstracts of the report. If even a moderate amount of time had been given to such reading, the statement could hardly have been made on page 90 of the issue of August 28th that the report recommends “government ownership of railways,” when no such suggestion appears anywhere in the report. Similarly it would have been impossible to leave the impression that the report tells only what “capital and labor believe,” and fails to tell “what trained experts believe.” As a matter of fact the report is made up of the condensed findings of fact and recommendations of the members of the staff, whose individual reports were prepared without dictation from Mr. Walsh or any other member of the Commission. Further, none of the investigators and experts concerned in the preparation of the final report was selected by Mr. Walsh or appointed at the instance of any of the Commissioners, who signed the staff report.

This statement should serve to dispose of the entirely gratuitous insinuation that “though it is stated that Mr. Basil Manly wrote the report, Mr. Walsh has undoubtedly secured the kind of report which he wished.” However, I cannot fail to express my resentment of the imputation that such men as Dr. George E. Barnett, Dr. Robert F. Hoxie, Dr. B. S. Warren and the other disinterested and independent members of the staff wrote at the dictation of Mr. Walsh or anyone else.

There is one other misstatement which I wish to notice, because it is so frequently repeated. It is stated that Mr. Walsh (who appears to be your symbol for the whole Commission) “paid scant attention to expert investigation, and devoted more of his time and money to public hearings.” You know, of course, that the public hearing policy was adopted not by Mr. Walsh, but after mature deliberation by the unanimous vote of all the Commissioners; but you may not know that the public hearings, including the preliminary investigations, cost a little less than *one-fourth* of the entire appropriation.

These are minor matters, however. The failure of the criticism lies in the fact that it reveals a complete misunderstanding not only of the report, but also of the character and causes of industrial unrest. The article assumes that

the problem of industrial unrest is a problem of governmental mechanics, to be solved by a benevolent, wise and scientific bureaucracy. The dominant idea, the *motif*, of the staff report is the fundamental conception that industrial unrest is the product of widespread prejudice and misunderstanding and of enormous maladjustments in our industrial, social, and governmental systems, which cannot be cured or removed by petty reforms and administrative innovations. The extent, character, and effects of these evils are not understood by the people generally or by the workers themselves. Furthermore, certain of these maladjustments are such as to prevent effective action, even if the people were awakened and informed. The purpose of the report, therefore, was primarily to convey the clearest possible portrayal of the character, extent, and effects of the existing abuses, and secondarily to indicate certain measures which are necessary before effective action on the part either of the workers or of the people as a whole will be possible.

Among these measures, which cannot be dismissed as “proposals for new legislation,” because they are essentially revolutions in social and governmental policy, the following may be noted as indicative of the character of the recommendations: first, the proposal for an inheritance tax, drastic enough in its terms to break up the enormous fortunes with their dangerous concentration of actual or potential social control; and second, the removal of the “judicial veto,” by denying to the courts the power of declaring laws unconstitutional. These measures were urged not as ends in themselves, but as the necessary foundations upon which later constructive action can rest. When a judge can annul the wisest and most necessary action simply because the plans do not coincide with his social and economic views, is it not desirable to strike directly at the root of the evil, instead of attempting to devise cunning schemes for circumventing judicial veto?

The contrast can best be illustrated by reference to the action of the New York Court of Appeals in the Williams and Schweinler cases involving the night work of women. The Court in the Schweinler case reversed its earlier decision, saying, in effect, that its economic views had been so greatly influenced by the elaborate evidence presented that it would not exercise its judicial veto as in the earlier case, but would permit the legislation to stand. The “constructive” idea of THE NEW REPUBLIC is to create elaborate machinery by which the economic ideas of the judges may perchance be so modified that they will not be more than half a century behind the rest of the world: the proposal

of the staff report is to take away from the judges a veto which exists in no other country, which they were not intended to possess here, and which makes them the final arbiters of our national destiny.

The enthusiastic acceptance by THE NEW REPUBLIC of the dictum of the Commons' Report that "the greatest cause of industrial unrest is the breakdown in the administration of labor laws" is almost pathetic. The nearsighted man who mistook the elephant for an ant had a far keener perception than the man who sees the labor movement and the surging tide of industrial unrest as the embodiment of despair, because, forsooth, labor laws are inadequately enforced.

What seems to damn the report in the eyes of THE NEW REPUBLIC, however, is what it calls "the failure to create a technique and an intellectual method and social machinery." Nice words! Words which have pith in a field of art and applied science, but which are painfully thin and meaningless when applied to the greatest problem of ninety million people. What is needed is not technique but understanding; not an intellectual method but an awakened social consciousness and sympathy. These needs the report attempted in some measure to supply, and by this criterion it must be judged.

BASIL M. MANLY.

Chicago.

[In one particular Mr. Manly is quite right: the Walsh report does not recommend the government ownership of railroads. This is our mistake, a bad editorial slip.

In his other points we believe him to be entirely wrong. It is true that the Commission ordered certain investigations which were made or at least begun, but so incomplete were they that an actual majority of the Commissioners, over their signatures, agreed to disregard them. It is a matter of common knowledge, reinforced by much direct testimony, that Mr. Walsh was entirely uninterested in investigations. His attitude cannot better be shown than by the following excerpt from Mr. Manly's draft report to the Commission. He says:

"In the investigation of questions so intimately affecting the lives of a large part of the American people, the ordinary methods of compiling facts and drawing deductions would have been utterly insufficient, not only because the ground to be covered was too large, but because the situation was too largely the result of the opinions, beliefs, and convictions of employers and employees to be susceptible of ascertainment by such a method. Furthermore, it became clear very early in the investigation that the problems which were presented could be solved only by the will and conscience of the American people acting either directly or through their representatives in the State and Federal governments."

Mr. Manly claims that we do not understand the character and causes of industrial unrest. Perhaps; we do not lay claim to have solved this problem. But what disappoints us most is that the Walsh report brings us no nearer to a real understanding. It seems to us naïve, obvious, uncritical. Where Mr. Walsh lacks an idea he sticks in a phrase; where he sees an evil which is complex and deeply rooted and difficult to solve, he asks for a law decreeing that the evil shall cease. Never mind if the proposed law is impossible to secure, impossible to enforce if secured, and injurious to the very parties that are to be protected. Never mind if the evil already is prohibited, and the new law will add no force to the prohibition. For example, there is nothing more sinister in our American life to-day than the

frequent denial in times of strikes of the rights of *habeas corpus*, jury trial, free speech and free assemblage. Therefore Mr. Walsh and Mr. Manly gravely propose "that Congress should forthwith initiate an amendment to the Constitution providing specifically for the protection of these rights." Does Mr. Walsh not know that it is almost impossible to secure an amendment to the Constitution if it is opposed by any considerable section of the community? And does he not also know that the very rights for which he is asking are already guaranteed, and for one hundred and twenty-seven years have been guaranteed, by the Constitution? Will it be more easy to enforce these rights if the Constitution guarantees them twice or ten times instead of once? Mr. Walsh also wants the Constitution to be changed so as to guarantee "the unlimited right of individuals to form associations, not for the sake of profit, but for the advancement of their individual and collective interests." Does Mr. Walsh believe that if this square little chunk could be incorporated into the federal Constitution, it would effectively prevent an employer from discriminating against union men? An unscrupulous employer, after the adoption of the proposed amendment as before, would simply say, "I do not discharge you because you are a union man, but because you are incompetent and I do not like the color of your eyes." In what sort of a world does Mr. Walsh live that he believes that he can perform delicate social operations with so heavy and blunt an axe?

Finally, we certainly do not think that industrial unrest can be dealt with by a mechanical bureaucracy. Where did Mr. Manly derive that notion? Is it because we praised the Commons Report? But the Commons proposal is not at all "mechanical." It is essentially an attempt to make industrial unrest visible and articulate. Of course it offers no solution. What it offers is a technique through which the democracy can approach the industrial problem.

As stated in our original comment, everyone long ago gave up hope that Mr. Walsh's wing of the commission would make any contribution to real knowledge. What it started out to do, and did with a good deal of success, was to popularize still more widely notions that were old nuts to the muckrakers. For that much, at least, all praise to Mr. Walsh and his associates. They have done a pretty good work of agitation in a period of desperate reaction. We have felt and feel now that Mr. Walsh and Mr. Manly are more right than many of their critics. They are truer to the human facts of industry to-day. But that they have squandered an opportunity to make this truth live, to give radical thought an authoritative foundation, that is a sad fact which all the fraternal good-will in the world cannot obscure.—THE EDITORS.]

Accountability

SIR: Germany's submarine attitude reminds us, who go down to sea in ships, of the innocent front some of the petty officers of the old navy used to present when "brought to the mast" for beating up some poor measly rooky landsman or coal-passer. The accused would look at his battered victim in a guileless manner, as if he had never seen him before, and when questioned about the assault would invariably make one of two statements: "No, indeed, Captain, I didn't hit him! All I done was just to push him away when I seen him comin' toward me!"; or, "Well, sir, he made a pass at me, and of course I had to defend myself!"

U. S. N.

High Seas.

After the Play

PERHAPS Strindberg was the first to put it in something like this absolute form: Whoever has been employed as reader for a theatrical manager must soon have noticed that every play submitted appeared to have been written for the sake of only one scene, and that all the other scenes were fillers. In this form the assertion may be true, though obviously it's not true of all plays. Dumas fils always intended to write with the conclusion in mind, and his best plays do in fact sound as if he had written them for the conclusion's sake. For him at his exactest, as for Euclid, "the end is the chief thing of all." But what Strindberg says is valid for many plays. Managers and stars incite the dramatist to exaggerate the weakness of such a method by asking him whereabout his big scene comes and what it is made of. The rest is filling. The rest should have been silence.

You have made, let us suppose, a three-act play which fills the evening so full that you don't have to split royalties. In the first act you show us, with relevant friends coming and going, an actress and a young man in love with her. Perhaps your scene is laid in his rooms, where he chivalrously refuses to hear insinuations that she is more than twenty-three or other than virgin. Perhaps your scene is a boat on the Thames near Maidenhead—a name free from symbolic intentions—and you show us the actress cutting her wrist with scissors, and the young man kissing the place to make it well. Or perhaps we see him helping her into her cloak, and something happening which obliged her to put more powder on her chin. In your second act she is in a cottage on the English coast, where at first we do not recognize her, both because we have reason to think her gone to the Riviera, and because, being sloppily dressed and nowise made up, she looks almost her real age, which is something over forty. Quite by accident your young man, who is on a walking trip, turns up at this cottage, and the actress tells him she is the actress's mother. You show us her disclosure of the truth about herself, and the effect of this upon his love for her. You have cause to be uncommonly pleased with this second act, which is written with "the life-touches and the secret graces," which is whimsical and quick, which pokes fun at your characters and is sorry for them. Your third act, which I haven't read yet, cannot hope to be so good as your second. If it is as good as your first, which was good enough, you will have done well.

Let us see what Sir James Matthew Barrie, who happens to have chosen the same subject, has done with it. "Rosalind," he calls his play, which is in only one act, and which Miss Marie Tempest has been giving at the Lyceum Theatre. Observe, if you please, what Barrie gains by choosing the one-act form. Were the play in three acts we should be just about certain, as soon as we recognized Beatrice Page in her cottage by the sea, that Charles Roche would turn up. When he did turn up, evidently by accident, the coincidence would shock us. Barrie has imagined his one act so that we hardly notice the coincidence, of which we learn the extent by degrees. Charles Roche enters the cottage. A young man he is—any young man, apparently. He recognizes a photograph of Beatrice Page on the mantelpiece. Nothing strange here, for ever and ever so many young men know by sight the famous Beatrice Page. Take what we learn in order: Charles recognizes the photograph, he knows the original, he hasn't merely seen her act, he has lunched with her twice, he is in love with her. So

gently does Barrie persuade us to allow him his needed coincidence that we do not refuse. By dexterous use of his one-act form he coaxes us into accepting this fact: One of the young men who are most seriously in love with Beatrice is just the young man who happens to put in an appearance.

But is Charles one of several young men who are seriously in love with Beatrice, or is he solitary in his seriousness? Were "Rosalind" a three-act play this uncertainty would have to be cleared up. We should have learned in the first act that he was the deepest in love, that he came nearer than anybody else to waking love in Beatrice—in which case the disclosure of her age would have caused something less far removed from tragedy. Or else we should have learned in the first act that Charles was only one among many young men feeling as he felt about her, all equally unimportant in her life—in which case the flavor of this second act would have been less unlike the cynical.

The mood in which we listen to "Rosalind," one act, would have been impossible to us if another act had come first. We should know too much. This excess of our knowledge, this difference in our mood, would have led the tactful, sensitive Barrie to write in a different tone, to have pitied with less playfulness, less whimsical gaiety. His one-act form has enabled him to keep many things where he wanted them, in the half-light. He has recognized the peculiarities of his medium, has used them so as to achieve in "Rosalind" the special Barrie surface which pleases him and pleases us. And he leaves out nothing that we need to know of the past. All that I have suggested, as material for your first act, is in this Barrie play: half a dozen speeches do the trick. Not a bad question for a self-critical playwright: Into how few speeches in my second act can I put the whole of act first?

It often pays to do thoroughly what I've been trying to do here in the case of "Rosalind." Strike into a play with almost any technical question, and before long you come upon something that betters your understanding of the playwright. The question doesn't, of course, need to be technical. A director approach will do as well. Suppose we take another Barrie one-acter, "The Twelve-Pound Look," which the Scribners published last year in the same volume with "Rosalind." Kate, who was once the wife of Harry Sims, ran away from him many years ago. She left a letter worded so as to make him think she had gone with another man. Her real motive was to escape the mortal boredom and the stifling moral and social atmosphere of Sims's house. Barrie's play is the meeting of Kate and her former husband. She might have learned at that meeting that Sims had been gladdened by her departure, that married life had bored him no less than her, that he had lived in fear of her reappearance, that he was too deeply pleased by the discovery of her continuing aversion to be wounded by her unflattering speeches. Or she might have found a Sims revised, improved, regenerated, have supposed the change caused by her leaving him, and have been shocked by his assertion that if she had gone away earlier his change would have had an earlier start. By considering the possibilities of such a meeting you will find, I think, that Barrie's choice of material was determined by his desire to give the woman a triumph all the more triumphant because the man doesn't quite understand it. Thanks be to Barrie, so the women say, who giveth us the victory, and who keeps man uncertain about the quality of his defeat.

Q. K.

Books and Things

THAT ideal construction, the quiet strong man, implies the existence of believers in his quietness and strength. Believers in his quietness may be had for the asking. To create and multiply believers in his strength is so hard that novelists, although they have a prodigious body of precedent to help them, find the problem repeatedly new. They know that the basis of our eulogistic wonder, the only kind they wish to excite, must be our flawless faith that the hero's self-control doesn't come easy. Theirs is the task of painting in splendid strength the forces which his stronger will beats down and keeps under. Precautions must be taken against our suspicion that his seven devils were eager to cut and run.

Even great novelists, finding the problem always new, do not always find it hard enough. George Meredith did not always. Emma says to Diana of Tom Redworth: "He is one of those rare men of honor who can command their passions." And Diana herself, when she kissed Redworth's arm, "had omitted to think she was dealing with a lover a man of smothered fire, who would be electrically alive to the act through a coat-sleeve. Redworth had his impulse. He kept it under—she felt the big breath he drew in." In vain, so far as I am concerned, these and the other labels. Redworth is constant and muscular: that is all I am sure of. Mr. Galsworthy has a like problem in his hands in "The Freeland," with this difference only, that rage is the fire he wishes us to think the gentle, shy, wild Tod Freeland capable of. So Mr. Galsworthy shows us a hearsay picture of Tod, some ten years ago, when he found a cattle-drover being cruel to a bullock. Tod's act was to shove the drover into a furze-bush and to hold him there. "Of the words assigned to Tod on this occasion, the mildest and probably most true were: 'By the Lord God, if you treat a beast like that again, I'll cut your liver out, you hell-hearted sweep.'" Such rage is bookish. You see clearer than ever the want this speech was designed to fill. Far more persuasive, to my taste, is this passage: "The severity of his morals contrasted so remarkably with the lax and dissolute manner of the young lords and nobles in the courts which he frequented, that these young springalds would sometimes sneer and call him Monk and Milk-sop; but his courage in the day of battle was so terrible and admirable, that I promise you the youthful libertines did not sneer *then*; and the most reckless of them often turned pale when they couched their lances to follow Ivanhoe."

This problem, which lesser artists than Meredith, Mr. Galsworthy and Thackeray too often deal with by imposing silence upon their heroic quiet strong man, or by allowing one half-sentence to escape him like one jet of steam, or by causing him in his struggle for calmness to bite through his pipe-stem, ceases every now and then to be merely literary and becomes practical and rational. As for example, at the present moment, when nearly all of us, barring the few Rooseveltian exceptions, and the few more whom circumstances have influenced to a less habitual vehemence, are anxious to keep out of war with Germany and yet to see ourselves as quiet strong men whom it would be dangerous and even possible to rouse. In my own case, resolutely though I yearn to see myself as quiet and strong, when I sit down and do my best another vision obtrudes—a vision of a man who looks at every German insult through a minifying eye, at every sign of German concession through

an eye that magnifies, and whose quietness would long ago have got up and given its seat to strength had he thought Germany likely to prove an antagonist no more formidable than Spain.

No, in this prolonged crisis, when nearly everybody is trying to find out how much daring must be added to caution in order to make caution prudence and prudence wisdom, I have not always been able to see myself as a quiet strong man, or to feel certain that others see me so. Consolation doesn't come until I remember that heroes in fiction would seldom appear quiet-strong if their creator didn't give them a great deal of help, and that I have had none from mine. Most of us are in this predicament. Certain literary artists are indeed doing their best to exhibit our strength as a nation, to demonstrate the folly of mistaking our collective forbearing quietness for debility. As individuals we lack explanatory champions. Only one among us is the centre of a swarm of interpreters, bent on proving that his quietness is strength controlled. To me no such proof has been necessary, except for a few hours last spring, when the Lusitania had been sunk, and when the President, in his first speech after that untoward event, surprised the world by asserting that a nation might be too proud to fight. Then for a moment I would have sacrificed all my faith in his quietness for a more perfect faith in his strength. But the mood passed. The first words spoken by our government directly to Germany brought back belief in the excellence of the President's will.

Then why do some of the Washington correspondents still try to do for the President what Mr. Galsworthy has tried to do for Tod Freeland? Perhaps they think President Wilson, although in truth a strong man, deficient in the conventional signs of strength. He is not curt, is not a violent rider, plays no dangerous game, is never publicly white-hot with rage, can speak without blasting or cowing his opponents. So little does he resemble the strong men of fiction that the correspondents have invented, have even succeeded in establishing, a new convention, according to whose law a motor trip, taken alone, immediately upon the receipt of international bad news, is the symbol of a terrific struggle between the President's sense of duty, which bids him leave undone nothing he might honorably do to avoid war, and the President's fighting impulse, which bids him set the trumpet to his lips.

This symbolism is interesting, although not even repeated encounters with it have convinced me of its expressiveness. None of us is privy to Mr. Wilson's soliloquies. My guess would be that when sitting lonely in his motor he doesn't have to devote much time to trampling his passions under foot, that in a calmness not very hard won he sets himself to the business of thinking things out, that what he brings home with him is gained less by laborious self-control than by considering in the light of new disturbing facts the relation of his two master aims. In my pictures of the President, in my invitations to think about him after a certain fashion, I should say nothing, were I a Washington correspondent, about the cost in hours of his repeated attainment of calmness, and much about his habit of keeping cool. Instead of endeavoring to supply a supposedly popular demand for signs of tempest stilled, I should do what I could to popularize a different kind of strong man, one whose quietness is so easy to him that he can give his whole time to using his head.

P. L.

Creative Portraiture

Contemporary Portraits, by Frank Harris. New York: Mitchell Kennerley. \$2.50 net.

IT was Whistler who reproved a critic for calling one of his pictures good and another one bad. "Say that you like the first and dislike the second," said he, "and you'll be fairly within your rights." The best thing about "Contemporary Portraits" is that they stick to this ground and contain no nonsense about impartial criticism. Holding strong first-hand convictions on artistic matters, Mr. Harris is no mere churner of milk and water impartialities. He makes no bones of liking Swinburne, Meredith, and John Davidson, and of disliking Carlyle, Renan, and Matthew Arnold. Not that he refuses to give even the devil his due. He is far too gallant for that. Besides, he has a conscience. And a man with a conscience no more dreams of degrading his devil than of degrading his God.

In a preface to the book, Mr. Harris calls himself an artist-reporter and justifies this designation by working creatively in spiritual material and not merely producing records on a cut and dried plan. He himself expressly disclaims the brute accuracy of fact when he says: "I am always artist rather than reporter and pretend to spiritual divination and not to verbal accuracy." This is the proper stand for a man of genius to take, and nobody will quarrel with Frank Harris for taking it. But why does he deny the same privilege to one of his contemporaries? Conversing with Renan about his work, "The Life of Jesus," he reproaches the French author for filling in the gaps in the story and making the portrait picturesque. "I would not have the story added to in any way," he tells Renan severely, and adds: "I would not use my own imagination at all." In a word, a biographer may use divination to round out a portrait if the subject lives to-day, but not if the subject lived in the hazy remoteness of two thousand years ago.

Mr. Harris defends his extraordinary position on the ground that Renan's interpretation is not implicit in the facts of the Gospels. But notice the chief example with which this criticism is illustrated. Renan is wrong, says Harris, in making Christ heroic. According to Harris: "Jesus is the saint to me and not the hero. He is the conscience and not the courage of humanity." Mr. Harris knows a higher courage and indicates Paul to represent it. Paul of Tarsus no less! Well, I have no reason to suspect that the Apostle to the Gentiles was less brave than the countless Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, or Mohammedan martyrs and missionaries who, in times past, have died for their faith at the stake, in the arena, or on the rack. But I can't help remembering that Paul pushed his mission with the most amazing concessions to the social, caste, and economic prejudices of his day. I pass over his curious Noachian views about women, which must have provoked the mirth even of his judge, Antonius Felix, and quieted that Roman governor's initial fear that he had a radical empiricist to deal with. But where does Paul stand in the war against the lopsided distribution of wealth, the great war which Christ began and James, his chosen apostle, carried on with unflagging zeal? Paul, who was not directly chosen by Christ, speaks in the following vein: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers: for *the powers that be, are ordained of God.* (Romans xiii, 1.) And in the same chapter, he says that whoever resists the temporal authorities, resists the laws of God, and "they that resist shall receive damnation." After this, the reader may decide for himself whether the dispute between Renan

and Harris was not based on a difference of divination, and whose the truer divination was.

Nothing could be more unjust than to give the impression that Harris can often be caught napping like this. Quite the contrary is the rule. And if his insight sometimes errs, his scrupulous fairness in stating an opposing side always enables us to get at the truth by doing a little addition and subtraction of our own. This is the case even in the article on Renan. Harris was stirred to antagonism by what he considered Renan's insufferable complacency and conceit. The result is that the whole sketch of Renan is askew, but not too much so to prevent us from correcting the obliquity and getting a good picture, by another sort of correction, out of a first rate caricature, like that of Johnson by Macaulay, the liveliest caricature in the whole range of artistic biography. I do not hold that Harris has done precisely this service for Renan, but I believe he has done it (in his own unique way) for Burton, Swinburne, and Meredith.

If the sleek, prosperous, and widely-admired artist stings Harris into frantic opposition, the scorned and unappreciated artist drives him to the other extreme. "Too much compassion inflames a loyal heart," said Voltaire, anticipating Harris out of the womb of time. For Harris, all his life long, has been a romantic champion of the under-dog and of the men who stand for unpopular causes. Let a deserving author be buffeted into neglect and misery by a world contemptuous of fine art, and Harris flies to surround him with a martyr's aureole and to paint him transfigured in its poetic radiance. It is this generous impulse that prompts him to passionate praises and immoderate estimates of the two suicides, Richard Middleton and John Davidson. "The least one can say of Middleton," he asserts, "is that at twenty-five he stood as an equal among the foremost men of his time in knowledge of thought and of life." His praises of Davidson are almost equally extravagant, but somewhat better deserved, since Davidson thought as well as sang, while Middleton was purely a fine verbal musician like Keats.

The French portraits—de Maupassant, Verlaine, Fabre, Maeterlinck, Rodin, and Anatole France—are all well done and entertaining, though without the fire or the go of the best English pieces, Whistler, Wilde, and Meredith. The vignette of Carlyle would be another fine achievement were it not that for once Harris' sympathy is in abeyance. He simply can't abide Carlyle's jeremiads against the Victorian cult of sensuous pleasure, although it is only fair to add that he praises Carlyle's open-mindedness and moral force unstintedly. But the Whistler shows the hand of the portraitist at its best. Here we get the pithy sketch of the subject's appearance, the terse and illuminating anecdote, the crisp repartee, the galvanic Whistlerian judgments on art and artists. And all these auxiliaries are artistically bound together by Harris' profound understanding of Whistler's fight against a public that had no scale of values, no love of beauty, and no sense of the divine. Whether in the Whistler sketch or in the others, however, and whether with prejudice or without, Harris knows a great man when he meets one. Moreover, he can strike off swift and graphic pictures of his favorite subjects and reveal the heart of them in a vivid image. What is almost as much to the point is his ability to see that contemporary art and literature contain as fine craftsmanship as ever the past brought forth. "The present hour is the decisive hour and every day is doomsday," says Emerson. Harris knows this, and is great in his own adventurous perception of greatness.

FELIX GRENDAON.

A German Accuses Germany

I Accuse (J'accuse), by a German. Translated by Alexander Gray. New York: George H. Doran Company. \$1.50 net.

THE chief significance of this book, which is an eloquent indictment of the German and Austrian diplomacy which led up to the war, lies in the assumption that it represents a criticism from the inside, that it is a German, not an English or French attack upon Germany. Over and over again we are assured that the author is *echt Deutsch*. "The man who wrote this book is a German. He is not a Frenchman, a Russian, or an Englishman. He is a German, who is uncorrupted and incorruptible, who is not bought and is not for sale. A German who loves his Fatherland like anyone else; but just *because* he loves it, he wrote this book." Unless the whole is an elaborate forgery, which to the reviewer, who has read this book both in German and English, does not seem probable, this attack is made by a German who stands aside from the passionate self-delusion of his own people and dares to tell the truth.

Wer die Wahrheit kennet und saget sie nicht
Der ist fürwahr ein embärmlicher Wicht.

Considered from this point of view, "I Accuse" is an encouraging symptom. Although the author for obvious reasons prefers to remain unknown, although we are not even told whether the book was written in Germany or in some neighboring country like Switzerland, where a man might think things out more clearly, still the mere fact that one man "born on German soil, trained in German culture, German in his ancestry, his speech and his thought" can come to a conclusion diametrically opposed to the official German view indicates that German opinion is not as terrifyingly unanimous as we have been told. It suggests that thousands of Germans may share these views. It holds out the hope that a somewhat more critical and open-minded attitude towards the war may develop within the Fatherland. A stirring book like "I Accuse" cannot be without effect. You can debar the actual printed volume from Germany; you cannot permanently shut out convictions and ideas.

The author of "I Accuse" accepts as a patriotic duty the task of rousing Germany from its present war intoxication. He hopes to do so by showing that Germany cannot possibly win the anticipated victory, and that it, together with Austria, bears the responsibility for bringing on the war. He rapidly reviews the antecedents of the war, discusses Bernhardt and other imperialists, "the place in the sun" theory, the doctrine of "encirclement," the German rejection of peace and disarmament proposals, the Giolitti revelations, and the growth of the war party in Berlin, and he concludes that the whole attitude of Germany from the first Hague Conference onwards indicates that she regarded the European war as inevitable, and was resolved to bring that war on at the most favorable moment. The rest of the book is taken up with an analysis of the diplomatic papers, which to the author's mind prove conclusively that Germany, with Austria, forced the war, lied about it, and lied awkwardly.

The author is not always fair to Germany. It is inevitable that he should lean backwards. Like Ramsay MacDonald and Bernard Shaw in England, so also the anonymous author of "I Accuse" is driven into a somewhat exaggerated and uncritical opposition to his own country. He is not nearly as generous towards Ger-

TIFFANY & Co.

PEARLS - A LARGE ASSORTMENT

FIFTH AVENUE AND 37TH STREET
NEW YORK

many as is the American Stowell or the Englishman Price, and he is much too prone to accept English, Russian, or, for that matter, Serbian proposals at their face value, while analyzing and dissecting German and Austrian proposals. But the book is essentially polemical. It is written by a man who feels deeply and who sees one side of a question at a time and sees that side clearly.

The sheer impact of the argument against Germany reveals the author as one skilful in the lawyer-like piling up of evidence. Germany, he contends, gave a free hand to Austria against Serbia, although acknowledging that such an action might lead to the European war. She permitted Austria to address to Serbia a humiliating ultimatum, and to declare war after Serbia had largely accepted Austria's demands. She suggested a localization of the conflict which she knew was impossible, in order with better grace to decline the conference of the four powers, which she feared would lead to peace. Instead she proposed direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and then permitted Vienna to refuse to take part in such conversations. She left unanswered the request frequently made by the other powers that she herself propose some method of mediation. She refused to discuss the various formulæ proposed by Grey and by Sazonof. She showed clearly as early as July 29th—when she asked for England's neutrality—that she was intent upon war at a time when the other powers were seeking to maintain peace. On July 31st she upset the negotiations between Russia and Austria, which at last had begun, by ultimata sent to Russia and France, and she demanded from Russia not only that she demobilize against

Germany but also against Austria, although Austria was herself mobilized against Russia. Instead of merely mobilizing, Germany immediately declared war upon false pretexts, known to be false. Finally, she violated the neutrality of Belgium, and made lying excuses for her action.

All the way through, Germany, according to the author, played a game of clumsy mendacity. He contrasts the pathetically blundering German diplomats, von Jagow, von Schoen, Pourtalès, von Flotow and the bellicose von Tschirschky with the crystal-minded and courageous French and English diplomats, Paul and Jules Cambon, Goschen, Viviani, Bienvenu-Martin and Sir Edward Grey. Having so bad a case, Germany should have had good lawyers to present it; being obliged to lie, she should have at least employed skilful liars. In the end, however, he excuses the diplomats, and half-excuses even von Bethmann-Hollweg, who "was driven to it—driven from above and from below."

The Civilian Canal Builders

Who Built the Canal? By W. Leon Pepperman. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. \$2.00 net.

TO whom should we assign chief credit for the successful execution of the Panama Canal project? Put the question to your neighbor, and it is ten to one he will say Colonel Goethals. And if your neighbor happens to be a regular army man, or even an out-and-out advocate of "preparedness," the chances are a hundred to one that Colonel Goethals will be credited with our success in this greatest of our recent national undertakings. To quote from so cautious a writer as General Carter in *The American Army*, "The reliability and excellence of the river and harbor work, under the War Department, caused the nation to turn to it when all those previously selected to dig the Canal had acknowledged failure."

This is not an opinion generally accepted in the engineering profession. There is nowhere a disposition to treat lightly the achievement of Colonel Goethals, who succeeded in maintaining in good order the colossal machinery of canal construction. But engineers assert that the machinery itself was built by Mr. Shonts and his associates, most of whom were practical railway men. And this is the thesis Mr. Pepperman defends. True, he praises generously "the masterly manner in which he [Colonel Goethals] completed the construction of the Canal after the plans had been formulated and the work begun by the railroad men." But he quotes with manifest satisfaction the less generous statement of a railroad engineer: "We built the machine and started it going, and then gave the handle to Goethals, who turned the crank and ground out the results." Mr. Pepperman was Chief of Office of Administration under the Shonts régime, and hence is to be regarded as an extremely competent witness, if not by any means a disinterested judge.

We are in the habit of holding the French Panama companies in contempt, as extreme examples of inefficiency. But according to Mr. Pepperman, the French achieved wonders, if regard be had to the adverse conditions under which they labored. Inefficiency on the Isthmus reached its climax with our own first Panama Canal Commission. While the excellent gentlemen of the Commission spun themselves in with red tape, the canal employees were dispersing, or hanging on in mortal fear of the yellow fever, whose ravages steadily increased, though the Commission had at their service the one man fitted to cope with the

situation, Colonel Gorgas. "Day after day," the Colonel is quoted as saying, "I would go to the Admiral [Walker] with requisitions for various things needed, and we would talk the matter over. He would always get on the subject [of economy]. 'Gorgas, there is one thing certain; whether we build the Canal or not, we will leave things so fixed that those fellows up on the hill can't find anything in the shape of graft after us.' He would then take my requisition and stick it in a drawer, and there it would remain for an indefinite time." Men were dying of yellow fever by the score, but the Admiral's record was clear. Here, by the way, we are very near to the fundamental explanation of red tape. To win merit by a record with nothing on it, good or bad—this is the root of evil in officialdom, military or civil.

Merit cannot be won in this way in active railway service. Hence with the appearance of Mr. Shonts and the railway men red tape vanished. Colonel Gorgas got all the money and men he wanted, and in a few months had yellow fever completely stamped out. And railway experience enabled Mr. Shonts and his associates to build up an employment agency in the States efficient enough to supply pressing needs.

The achievements of the railway régime, as recorded by the author, may be summarized as follows: The transformation of the Zone from the worst pest hole in the world into the most healthful spot in the tropics; the rebuilding of the Panama railway; the preparation of plans for the whole work of excavation, which had only to be followed in detail to produce the maximum of efficiency and economy; the building up of a force of 37,000 laborers—within 6,000 of the maximum employed; the organization of employment agencies to recruit whatever additional labor might be required from time to time; provision for housing the Canal force and supplying it with abundant and wholesome food; the control of shipping connections with the United States; the organization of purchasing agencies. Of the work of excavation relatively little had been done. But with the organization existing at the close of the Shonts régime—given a chief of sufficient force of character to hold it together—the Canal would dig itself. All that remained between the Shonts organization and the completion of the Canal was time and money, and no limit had been fixed upon either.

To one who stands outside of the controversy it appears unlikely that so sharp a division can be drawn between the originating function of the Shonts régime and the routine function of the Goethals régime. But we are in no danger of overlooking the work of the man who was in charge when the Canal was completed, while few of us have an adequate conception of the achievements of the men who went out with Mr. Shonts. They served us valiantly, and some returned broken in health and fortune. Engineers grow passionate when they speak of the work of John F. Stevens, some of the best engineering work ever done by an American, and indispensable to the success of the Canal in its early stages. How much does the public remember of the work of Stevens? And so Mr. Pepperman has performed an important service in claiming justice for the railway men and their work. Say his book is biased: the case calls for bias. In spite of the fact that he writes with polemic purpose, Mr. Pepperman writes entertainingly, with touches of droll humor that are usually successful. The volume is illustrated with excellent drawings of Canal scenes by Joseph Pennell.

ALVIN S. JOHNSON.

\$350

The Lyon & Healy Piano

\$350


The Best Piano Value in America

Fifty years experience is represented in this most popular of Pianofortes.

Ask your dealer for the Lyon & Healy—If he hasn't it, write to us for a Design Book.

LYON & HEALY

ESTABLISHED 50 YEARS
CHICAGO



6% Short Time Investment

If you have funds to be placed safely for a short period at attractive rate, send for circular No. 852NR describing—

A proved, well-secured investment combining these strong features—

Assets 5 to 1. Earnings 9 to 1.

70 years successful history.

Substantial part of loan already paid off.

Peabody, Houghteling & Co.

(Established 1865)

10 So. La Salle Street

Chicago

THE CENTURY

for October

Meddling with Our Neighbors

Have we Belgianized Nicaragua? The Stars and Stripes were floating over the White House in the Capital of Nicaragua when Lincoln G. Valentine wrote this astounding article. For five years Nicaragua has been virtually in charge of American marines. Why? Because the United States wants a perpetual canal route option in Nicaragua, wants a naval base, etc. The five Central American Republics, formerly a single union, are clamoring for re-union and armed resistance to the "Eagle of the North."

Old Masters of Photography

Alvin Langdon Coburn, himself a master of the art of which he writes, tells about four great pioneers in the field of photography; about their personalities, the means they used to get effects, the initial difficulties they surmounted, etc. Illustrated with reproductions of famous early photographs.

The Average Voter

Is the average voter a failure? Is there an average voter? The war has shaken up things, and people are taking stock—stock of their ideas as well as their more material defences. Walter Weyl, in this searching article, takes stock of America's voting quality.

My Début in Paris

Francis Grierson, the strange musical genius who was raised in America from his childhood and then amazed Europe with a new kind of music, tells of his introduction to the brilliant Parisian society of the end of the Second Empire.

Female Delicacy in the Sixties

What is so rare as a swooning lady now? But they weren't rare sixty years ago. They were the ideals then. Amy Louise Reed, in an article delightfully sauced with satire and illustrated from pictures of the period, discusses the almost incredible foolishnesses of and about women, especially young women, before the Civil War.

"Here Comes Grover"

The Fat Boy is peculiar to himself, typically unique. His heart and mind know different reactions from those of an ordinary mortal. His bashfulness betrays strange complexes. Grover, in Frank Leon Smith's story, lives, breathes—and pants.

Rome Rampant

Did Italy go to war to avoid revolution at home? Many people have been unable to see why the government at Rome plunged into the blood and expense of war when by threats alone it had forced Austria to offer virtually all that was openly demanded. T. Lothrop Stoddard analyses the Italian situation in his usual clear, vigorous, entertaining way.

The Friends

One of the best short stories of the year, a thing of almost uncanny fascination. It is made of men and things as commonplace as cabbages; yet through some legerdemain in the telling it achieves a continuously cumulative interest that is fairly astounding.

And

"Pleasures and Palaces," the third instalment of Princess Lazarovich's sprightly reminiscences of social and artistic life in Europe; the third instalment of "Dear Enemy," Jean Webster's very charming serial; the fourth instalment of "We Discover New England," in which Louise Closser Hale and Walter Hale visit the North Shore; two humorous short stories; "The Long Way," a piece of vigor and splendor in verse by Badger Clark; verse of distinction by Louis Untermeyer and others; and THE CENTURY'S customary offering of inset pictures.

THE CENTURY CO., 353 Fourth Ave., New York City

Gentlemen: Please find enclosed \$4. for which send THE CENTURY for one year, beginning with the October number, to

Name.....

Address.....

(N. Rep.-9-15)